


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AUGUSTA HISTORICAL BULLETIN



JED HOTCHKISS

AUGUSTA COUNTY HISTORICAL SOCIETY

Volume 34

Spring 1998

Number 1

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A purpose of the Augusta County Historical Society is to publish *Augusta Historical Bulletin* to be sent without charge to all members. Single issues are available at \$4 per copy.

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Home Demonstration Women Go to Market: Augusta County Curb Markets in the 1930s

by
Dr. Ann E. McCleary

Recalling her youth in Augusta County in the 1930s, Ora Thompson Lotts remembers how farm women like her mother considered the new home demonstration curb markets as a way to accomplish some of their own goals. "The men were busy outside," Lotts reflected. "What the women did in the house, that was all right, you know, as long as it didn't cost! So women had to get busy on the curb market and make their money to get things."¹

From its inception as girls' "tomato clubs" in the 1910s, the home demonstration program promoted remunerative work for rural women and girls, urging them to use their skills and develop new ones to earn their own cash income. Virginia extension home economists promoted an ideology of the productive farm women, emphasizing that rural women were and should be considered equal partners in the "business" of the farm. The curb markets created by county home demonstration agents and club women in the 1930s are one of the best illustrations of this ideology. Many club members fondly recall their involvement in these markets as some of their most memorable and rewarding experiences in the home demonstration program.



Staunton curb market vendor selling a variety of cakes, 1941. Photograph from National Archives

With the commercialization of poultry and dairy work during the 1920s and 1930s, rural women found their traditional opportunities for income-producing work diminishing. Although many farm women continued to market surplus eggs, chickens, or butter, the marketing networks were changing. As automobiles became more commonplace in the 1920s, rural families began to trade less at the nearby country stores, which had been relatively accessible by

¹Ora Thompson Lotts, interview with author, Spottswood, Virginia, 3 March 1993.

walking to farm women, and more in the larger towns like Staunton and Waynesboro, located at greater distances from home. Oral histories suggest that because farm women had so many responsibilities on the farm, they went to town less often and their husbands took over marketing their produce along with other farm goods. Regina Hutchens Kesterson recalled, for example, that her mother had seven children in ten years and was too busy with the work at home to make frequent trips to town. Frieda Kiracofe Miller recalled that her mother traded eggs at the country store near her house in the 1920s, because it was within walking distance, but her father marketed her mother's other goods at more distant markets, taking tomatoes to the cannery in Bridgewater and other goods to various businesses in Staunton. Virginia Stickley Berry's father "went to town once a week in the spring wagon," where he had regular customers for butter, eggs, and strawberries as well as garden produce. His wife would go in only occasionally to get goods and clothes for the family.²

The advent of the Great Depression in the 1930s changed the marketing practices of many Augusta County farm women once again. USDA home economists had suggested cooperative marketing as a strategy for remunerative work for rural women in the 1910s and 1920s. Although some home demonstration clubs around the state had begun to talk about improving marketing during these decades, the crisis of the 1930s intensified the need for such efforts. Women's cash contributions were often sorely needed as farm incomes declined. To address this crisis, Virginia home demonstration agents began to initiate curb markets across the state with good success. One of the most prosperous markets was established in 1930 in Staunton. The following year, women in the eastern part of the county established a similar market in Waynesboro. These two markets led the state in sales and participation throughout the 1930s.³



Staunton curb market vendor selling dressed poultry, which she displayed in a refrigerated case at the market, 1941. Club women were required to purchase their own scales. Photograph from National Archives.

²Frieda Kiracofe Miller, interview with author, Mt. Solon, Virginia, 13 July 1993; Virginia Stickley Berry, interview with author, Spring Hill, Virginia, July 1993; Regina Hutchens Kesterson, interview with author, Spottswood, Virginia, 27 May 1994. Histories of Augusta County suggest that businesses in the smaller country towns declined in the 1930s as families began to trade more in larger markets like the county seats. See Harold E. Skelton, *Weyers Cave's First Century* (Broadway, VA: Branner Printing Services, 1974), 12, 28-9, 35, 42.

³Grace Townley had encouraged club members to consider marketing in her 1920 statewide program plan, asking members to consider such questions as "What marketable products can we raise in this community? Can the club develop a community marketing plan? Can the club cooperate with the town to make a curb market a success?" See Grace Townley, *Program for Home Demonstration Clubs* (Blacksburg: Virginia Agricultural Extension Bulletin No. 57, January 1920).

There are at least two stories about how the Staunton market got started, one from the agent, Ruth Jamison, and one from the club women. Jamison reflected that she suggested the idea of a market because of the financial needs that she saw among her club members:

They were pretty bad off. I had a council, and the leading women from different communities would come in and plan the programs, and one woman said, "The sheriff is taking our farms away from us because we can't pay our taxes... We can live because we have enough food, but we can't pay our taxes."

Jamison believed that a curb market would be successful because she thought Augusta County women made "the best food I ever ate."

So I said, "Now will you come in and help us to start this curb market?" I told them what I had seen that they had made, and said "Now I want you to bring that and bring all your surplus...If you don't want to come to the curb market that's all right, but I want you to help me start it."⁴

Club members reported a slightly different story in a play they wrote to celebrate the forty-year history of club work in the county:

It must have been by the late twenties that our much loved Mrs. Coiner here heard of a country woman who brought her homemade butter to town and could not sell it. For this event Mrs. Coiner began thinking and soon afterwards read of such an organization in other parts of the country. She contacted our Home Demonstration agent—then Miss Ruth Jamison. They together studied, worked and toiled over their plot until they decided to go to the mayor of Staunton for assistance.

Significantly, it was around this issue of marketing butter, one of women's traditional products, that farm women organized the market.⁵

The Staunton curb market opened the Saturday before Easter in April 1930, and became an instant success. By July, total market averaged about \$135 each week. The curb market moved to a permanent indoor location in the spring of 1931, operating year-round each Wednesday and Saturday, and the second market in Waynesboro opened. The number of vendors in both markets increased to 122 in 1933, and total yearly sales combined averaged around



Home demonstration club woman displaying assortment of home-grown vegetables and berries along with greens and flowers, 1941. Photograph from National Archives.

⁴Ruth Jamison, interview with author, Blacksburg, Virginia, 23 January 1981.

⁵Untitled script for play to celebrate forty years of home demonstration work, manuscript preserved in Middlebrook Home Demonstration Club Scrapbook, in possession of author; "Homemakers to Tell 40 Year HD Clubs' History, November 12," undated newspaper article also in scrapbook.

\$56,000 by the mid-1930s. Because only club women could participate, the curb market helped to boost club membership. Several women joined home demonstration clubs to have the opportunity to sell on the market and at least one club—the Beverley Manor Club—was formed of women who lived around the city and wanted to participate in the market.⁶

Ruth Jamison encouraged club women to produce and sell old-fashioned items which would appeal to city women. Both customers and vendors believed that the products made and sold by rural women were better and healthier than those produced in factories or commercialized operation. Ruth Jamison encouraged club members to bring items at which they excelled, like at a covered dish dinner, rather than to introduce modern recipes. Jamison recalled, "Instead of riding down to Blacksburg and telling them to come down and teach these women how to make things, I asked all those good women who made those good things." Louise Cooley, who became the county agent in 1940, commented that "Town women feel that they can get better dressed poultry and fresh eggs on the curb market than they can get elsewhere."⁷

At the same time, Jamison and other agents insisted that the markets look and be modern. Agents used the markets to teach lessons in sanitation as well as business skills. "Nobody could come and put just any food on," recalled Jamison; she had to approve all items sold on the market. Extension home economists encouraged women to standardize their goods and grade products for the market. Agents expected vendors to take on the appearance of modern home economists, touting their newly-honed business skills and home economics education. One observer of the Staunton market reported in 1936:

To go in and see one of these buzzing centers in action is really thrilling, all the market women with crisp white smocks and head bands, their standardized products wrapped in cellophane and displayed on uniform tables recently built in.⁸

Club women sold a wide variety of products, from ones they had traded at the country store to items they had made but seldom sold. The most popular items sold on the market were those which women had traditionally marketed: eggs, poultry, and home-made butter. Baked goods were the next most popular item, from cakes and pies to rolls, salt-rising bread, cream puffs, and



Market customer leaves Staunton curb market with her purchases, 1941. Photograph from National Archives.

doughnuts. Many club women specialized in particular baked goods. Ina Berry and her daughter Edith built a reputation based on their "delicious cakes," including angel food, Lady Baltimore, Lord Baltimore, Brown Stone Front, caramel cake, and fresh coconut cake, and Mrs. Berry's other daughter, Lucille Masincupp, specialized in pies—especially chocolate, coconut, and butterscotch. Hazel Van Lear described pound cake as her specialty, while Mrs. Louie Ware recalls her chiffon cake and chocolate



Two vendors at the curb market meet with the market manager, a paid position for a home demonstration club member, 1941. Photograph from National Archives.

cake. A third major category was produce, from fruits and vegetables "which could not otherwise be disposed of for cash" to flowers to wild greens like bittersweet, watercress, or sassafras roots. The home-made touch carried over into craft items, like mats or rugs. As Hazel Van Lear remembered, "We sold everything that we didn't need here."⁹

Club women used the smells and sights of their goods to draw city people to the market. Several women brought cooked home-cured hams to the market and cut them there for customers. As Jamison recounts, "As soon as [the customers] would come in, they would smell the ham, and the line would line up all the way around to here to get that ham, and of course that was a smart woman to sell that." Although the fresh-cut flowers did not garner large incomes, they cost little to collect and the women "took much pleasure in their work with them." An article in the *Extension Division News* described the Staunton market as a "flower shop" in the spring and summer, noting that "these ingenious women have found that the flowers get the customers there."¹⁰

Many women realized substantial incomes through their market work. In 1934, the average yearly sales per vendor was \$456. This was a considerable sum in relation to the income of a Virginia farm family, which, in 1940, averaged \$605 in cash. Individual vendors often grossed over \$100 on a busy day, particularly right before a holiday such as Thanksgiving, Christmas, or Easter. Particularly ambitious club women, who were willing to put in a large amount of time and energy could produce very substantial profits. Josephine Wine led the market sales in 1934 with \$1,550 made from fresh vegetables, potato chips, bread, and baked products. Two years later, in 1936, Nettie Shull tallied the highest individual annual sales, with over \$2,000 from an "outstanding [home smoked] potato chip business," as well as sales of doughnuts, old-fashioned fried apple pies, potato salad, and dressed poultry.¹¹

⁶See AR, 1930-1940.

⁷AR, 1940; Jamison, interview.

⁸Virginia Agricultural and Mechanical College, Extension Division, *Extension Division News*, hereinafter referred to as *EDN*, 18 (February 1936) 4:4.

⁹Hazel Simmons Van Lear, interview with author, Spring Hill, Virginia, 14 June 1994.

¹⁰AR, 1934, 1938: *EDN* 15 (March 1933) 3:1; *EDN* 16 (April 1934) 4:4; Jamison, 23 January 1981; Kesterson, 27 May 1994; *EDN* 18 (February 1936) 4:4.

¹¹AR, 1934, 1936; *EDN* 18 (February 1936) 4:4; *EDN* 21 (April 1939) 6:3; *EDN* 17 (March 1935) 4:2; *EDN* 23 (January 1941) 3:5.

The home demonstration agents also used curb markets to teach farm women business and marketing skills. Club women ran the "business," and one woman was paid to be the market manager. Women directed the preparations for the market, and their husbands or children often helped with some part of the process, from butchering to dressing the chickens to shelling nuts to gathering vegetables. Men usually drove their wives to the market, because many rural women did not drive, but also because a second person was needed. Hazel Van Lear recalled how she needed her husband's help: "He drove and went with me most of the time. I went a few times by myself, but it was hard for one person to go because of unloading all that stuff you know, on your table, and getting ready and then at the same time customers would be coming to buy and you just almost had to have two people to go." When asked if her husband's taking her to the market interfered with his farm work, Lucille Masincupp recalled that "it was good money, and the men worked around it."¹²

Some women developed such a strong trade that they chose to leave the market to establish their own businesses. Lucille Masincupp recalled that her mother, Ina Berry, had enough orders from customers who would come to her home that she no longer had to travel to the market to sell. Ina's daughter Edith developed her own business of supplying all the cakes for a private girls boarding school in Staunton. Another woman packed lunches for sale to the newspaper office, two stores, and several banks.¹³

Club women took great pride in the money they earned. They collected the money at the market and determined how it would be used. This did not mean that club women reserved the money only for personal uses. Farm women used at least some of their incomes to help with overall farm expenses: paying the taxes or the mortgage or buying tractors or farm stock. With the lower cash incomes of the depression years, recalled another woman, her mother considered this not "extra money, but money to keep us going"—money to buy food, clothing, or other items the family needed. But every woman interviewed also reserved some money for her own priorities, such as sending a child to college or saving money to buy the family's first home. Many women made home improvements that they wanted, such as wiring the house for electricity or purchasing modern appliances, justifying the expense in part by arguing that



Staunton curb market vendor unloading goods she is bringing to sell at the Saturday market, 1941. Her husband, still in the car, is helping her to unload. Photograph from National Archives.

¹²Van Lear, interview with author, Spring Hill, Virginia, 13 July 1993; Lucille Masincupp, interview with author, Spring Hill, Virginia, 16 June 1994.

¹³Ar, 1930, 1931; EDN 12 (July 1930) 9:2; Masincupp, interview. Hazel Van Lear, who sold at the market from 1930 through 1947, found that it was easier to have her regular customers come to her house or for her or her husband to deliver the orders. Van Lear, 13 July 1993.

they were improving their place of business. The 1939 annual report reveals the diversity of uses for curb market proceeds:

Six women wired the home and outbuildings and bought all light fixtures, five paid for education of their children, three paid all farm taxes last year, one bought a tractor costing \$1,000, six paid a farmhand, six painted the house, five homes were remodeled, nine brooder houses built, seven electric refrigerators purchased, nine electric washing machines were bought, twelve kitchens with running water installed, and \$4,005 was paid on note.¹⁴

While the curb market offered benefits for rural women, participation also required a commitment of time and hard work, during years in which women were already increasing their productive activities simply to keep the family afloat. Market preparations, even when one only sold on Saturday, took all week. The most time-consuming work occurred on Thursday and Friday. Hazel Van Lear recalled, "I usually started on Thursday, churned, got the butter all ready, and put it in the refrigerator. And then I made my pound cakes on Thursday, because it didn't hurt them to stand like it does the layer cakes... If we had vegetables or things like that to get ready, we'd do that sometimes, things that it didn't hurt. You know everything had to go there in perfect condition."

On Fridays, Van Lear began her preparations around seven in the morning, as soon as she finished breakfast: "I baked the layer cakes and iced them, and made the cottage cheese, and [would] bake the bread and a half dozen other things, dress the chickens."

She also had to pack up her goods: "You had to wrap all your cakes and your baked stuff and put your ice on the chickens." Van Lear tried to finish by eleven at night, but reflected "You didn't figure on getting much sleep on Friday night." There was still more to do Saturday morning, before going to the market: "I usually mixed the cottage cheese at mornings, put pure cream in it... Well, I washed up things if I had time, but if I didn't, they stayed there until I got back on Saturday evenings. We tried to get to Staunton at seven o'clock but we didn't always make it."¹⁵



Nettie Shull, one of the leading curb market vendors in Staunton curb market, 1941. Photograph from National Archives. The caption with this photograph at the archives reads:

"Mrs. Luther Shull has made a specialty of home smoked potato chips and doughnuts. After frying the doughnuts the potato chips are cooked in the same fat which is an economy. The potatoes clarify the fat.

Mrs. Shull is one of the 28 marketeers who appreciates the cooperative movement. She is a member of the Shenandoah Valley Rural Electric Cooperative and through the proceeds from the Cooperative market, she wired and lighted the house and farm buildings, and has purchased a refrigerator, washing machine and other small appliances for her home."

¹⁴Masincupp, interview; Jamison, 3 October 1993; AR, 1934, 1935, 1939.

¹⁵Van Lear, interview, 13 July 1993.

Still, in spite of the hard work, club women appreciated the market not only for its income but also for the fellowship they gained. In her 1930 annual report about the curb market, Ruth Jamison wrote:

Several women have not missed a day. They have made friends and have regular customers which they feel would miss them if they stayed away. One woman stated that the market has not only proved profitable, but they have made friends, among both country and town women.

A comradeship had developed between not only rural and town women, but also between those women who sold on the market. "I liked the social part," recalled Lucille Berry Masincupp. "I had a ball while I was there."¹⁶

When farm economies rebounded in the 1940s, interest in these curb markets declined. Younger rural women found that they could make more money with less hard work and fewer hours by pursuing other occupations than the curb market. Many of these women had observed how hard their mothers had worked on the market, and some had first-hand experience in helping with market preparations. After listening to Mrs. Van Lear's description of her weekly preparations, another former curb market vendor remarked, "They wouldn't work that hard any more, would they?" to which Van Lear replied, "No I don't think they would." The curb market continued on until the late 1960s, when it was disbanded.¹⁷

The curb markets became and often still remain a great source of pride to those club members who participated. Their success brought them considerable local and sometimes state-wide attention and reinforced the value of their work. As Ruth Jamison recalled, "After they started it, they got such a reputation, you couldn't get them off." Reflecting on "What Home Demonstration Work Means to My Community," Mrs. A. M. Berry wrote:

Many women say our curb market has meant more to them than any other phase of club work...In fact, I doubt if some of us could have carried on during the depression if it had not been for this boost to our funds and morale."¹⁸

The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of many former home demonstration club members and curb market vendors, some of whom are quoted in this article, for sharing their time, memories, and occasionally their recipes. Special thanks is also offered to Phyllis Wampler, who helped to arrange many of the interviews. If any readers have information or stories about the curb market that they would like to share or can identify people in the photographs, please contact the author at the History Department, State University of West Georgia, Carrollton, GA 30118. This is an ongoing research project, and any assistance is greatly appreciated.

¹⁶AR, 1930, 1931, 1934; Masincupp, interview.

¹⁷Hazel Van Lear and Phyllis Wampler, interview with author, Spring Hill, Virginia, 13 July 1993. Half of the young women in the junior clubs, many of whom had helped their mothers at the curb market, reportedly had "regular jobs" by 1934. Other detriments to curb market participation during World War II were sugar rationing and wartime food conservation measures.

¹⁸Jamison, 23 January 1981; Mrs. A. M. Berry, "What Home Demonstration Work Means to My Community," MS [no date].



Green with Envy: Reflections on a Campaign Well-Lost

by

Daniel A. Metraux, Professor of Asian Studies, Mary Baldwin College

Daniel A. Metraux, Professor of Asian Studies at Mary Baldwin College offers historical society members this reflection on some very recent history. In 1997, Metraux ran as the Green Party candidate against incumbent Vance Wilkins for a seat in the Virginia General Assembly.

When Eric Sheffield, a long-time leader of the Rockbridge chapter of the Green Party of Virginia, called me early last April to ask whether I would consider running as the party's candidate in Virginia's 24th House District against incumbent Republican House Minority Leader Vance Wilkins, I accepted with alacrity.

I had nominally joined the Greens a year earlier by sending in a tiny donation, but had done nothing to activate the membership until Sheffield's call. I had been a lifelong Democrat, but had become very dissatisfied with the Staunton Democratic Committee. In my opinion, the Democratic Party in this part of the Valley is effectively an aged, barely alive dinosaur devoid of any ideas or meaning. The Staunton-area is exceedingly conservative and unabashedly Republican.

A colleague in Staunton noted recently that a seemingly hopeless campaign such as mine has merit because "it is a way to get a message out, an alternative vision of how the world can look, and I think that is important. The stupidest thing about the prevailing capitalist system is that people assume it is natural law, that this is not a chosen system at all but is ordained by nature to be the only way the world can work. Thus there is almost as little opposition to it as there is to the law of gravity." These words are not mine, but they explain the purpose of my candidacy exactly.

Sometimes principle is more important than practicality or pragmatism. A former Labour member of the British Parliament wrote recently, "As the dreadful Clinton experience has shown, improvisation without a governing philosophy to hold it in check can easily degenerate into a shiftless, poll-driven opportunism." The focus of the recent gubernatorial election in Virginia was on trivial issues like the car tax; both candidates ignored such important issues as our eroding environment, health insurance, quality education, and campaign finance reform. My goal was to force a public debate on many issues that would have been impossible in a one-man race.

The strategy worked. Every forum that I and other Green Party candidates attended soon erupted into vigorous debates on these major issues between conservative incumbents and more liberal Greens. Because we were challenging the status quo, we were able to move each debate to a discussion of the Green agenda. It has been a long time since Staunton has seen an election campaign based on issues, not personalities.

I believe elections in Staunton are a mockery of democratic principles. Because the Republicans are the only significant force in the region, most elections are uncontested, although some desperate voters voice their displeasure through write-ins. An unopposed candidate a few years ago drew in a respectable number of write-in votes for Jesus Christ, but He was out polled by Satan and almost lost out to my candidate of choice, Daffy Duck. But when Republicans are as entrenched as Vance Wilkins, no one can really blame the Democrats for not wishing to make a strong challenge.

The Green Party is a worldwide phenomenon that began in the late 1960s and 1970s. Green Parties in Germany and France have won many seats in provincial and national parliaments and are part of the governing coalition in France. Greens have done well recently in Australia, New Zealand and several western states in the United States, including California. The Green Party of Virginia has a strong base in its Rockbridge (Lexington) chapter. Five members from the Rockbridge chapter challenged incumbent members of the House of Delegates this November. Two Rockbridge Greens were elected to local Soil and Conservation Boards.

The Green Party of Virginia stands strong on preserving and protecting the environment, but it places an equally strong emphasis on building community values. It advocates strong support for local businesses, newspapers and entrepreneurs to help them survive onslaughts by national chains that have no interest in the local community. Greens want to enhance democratic rights by being pro-choice and pro-civil rights for gays and lesbians. The Green Party supports unions, collective bargaining, and a higher minimum wage. It advocates a single-payer health insurance system, bottle deposits, and initiative and referendum.

The great irony of the election was that because all incumbents in the region (all but one are Republicans), had no major party opposition, the Greens became the only opposition party. I knew full well that there was absolutely no chance to defeat Vance Wilkins, but the failure of the Democrats to launch even a token candidate provided a chance to educate and inform local voters about the Green Party. Today the Green Party serves as the loyal opposition to the GOP in the Staunton area.

But how does one launch a quixotic campaign against the most powerful Republican in the House with a campaign war chest of \$125,000+? There is no Green Party organization, I only raised \$505, and I had to devote most of my energy to teaching at Mary Baldwin. A former colleague, Ashton Trice, who had considerable contact with Wilkins and his staff concerning funding for the college's teaching program at the Goochland Prison, suggested that any effort to attack Wilkins would backfire and reminded me of the strong friendly links between Mary Baldwin and Wilkins. It became clear that a negative campaign would create a bad image for Greens and could hurt the college.

I decided to wage a "gentlemanly issues-oriented" campaign with the hope that voters would not be distracted by hollow rhetoric and instead would focus on the Green platform. Because we had little money for advertising, we depended on the media. We successfully sought interviews with local reporters and their generally fair reporting of our stands had the same effect as distributing tens of thousands of leaflets throughout the region. We appeared at every campaign dinner or debate and got some good television reporting. By the end of the campaign, many voters in the area knew that I was running. We handed out leaflets at community festivals and did a little door-to-door campaigning, but that was difficult with so little money, time, or staff.

The most pleasant surprise was the cordial relationship I developed with Wilkins. We both clearly enjoyed our time together. He even came to Mary Baldwin to one of my classes where we conducted a 90-minute informal debate that got excellent local press coverage. But it was also obvious that had the outcome of the election been in doubt, the gentlemanly aspect of the campaign would have disappeared. Wilkins noted with some sadness that because the object of campaigns is to get votes and negative campaigning is a proven way of getting votes, that form of campaigning is necessary in closely contested elections. He also candidly told my students that the voter should never fully trust a politician, not even himself.

Was such a quixotic campaign worth all the time and effort? Yes, definitely. The presence of the Green Party forced a public debate on the issues and we gave the voters a clear choice. The gentlemanly nature of the campaign permitted considerable goodwill and mutual respect among the candidates. It was a unique opportunity to meet all of the state's major politicians and to learn a great deal about Virginia politics. It was fascinating to sit at dinner and to ask Wilkins about what really goes on in Richmond. Politics Virginia-style is indeed fun!

Although I did not vote for Jim Gilmore for Governor and publicly attacked his No Car Tax plank as a gimmick, my one personal encounter with our Governor-Elect was very pleasant. All state-wide and local candidates shared a stage at Buena Vista on Labor Day and gave short speeches, but by the time I got up to deliver my talk, all of the Democrats had long since left. But the Republican ticket remained until the end, except for Jim Gilmore who was called away for a phone call. Ten minutes later as I was heading back to my car, I felt a sudden tap on my shoulder. Gilmore had raced over to apologize for his "rude sudden departure." It was a very decent gesture that set the tone for my campaign.

I ultimately won 17 percent of the vote against Wilkins' 83 percent. My goal was 15-20 percent, so it was not a disaster. Seventeen percent in Staunton and 12 percent in the county were fine, but the 21-22 percent on Wilkins' home turf where I never campaigned was explained by Wilkins who noted that the more one gets to know about a politician at home, the less popular he becomes. I will continue working for local Greens, but doubt that there will be another actual Metraux campaign anytime soon.



THE DUNKERS OF STAUNTON: The Establishment of the Staunton Church of the Brethren

by
J. Susanne Simmons

The Augusta County Historical Society's third annual dinner meeting was held Monday, March 3, 1998 at the Staunton Church of the Brethren. At the conclusion of the banquet, the approximately 160 persons who attended moved to the church sanctuary where they heard a talk about the history of Stokesville, an early 20th-century boom town in northwest Augusta County. Drs. Clarence Geier and Raymond Hyser of James Madison University delivered the presentation. Those who are interested in the history of the church that hosted the group for the evening should read the following article.

After their arrival in Germantown, Pennsylvania in the eighteenth century, the German Baptist Brethren, known as Dunkers among their countrymen, pressed westward onto the frontier. There they settled tracts of land in western Maryland and the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia, establishing closed agricultural communities centered around Dunker meetinghouses.

As the nation changed from an agrarian to an industrial economy in the nineteenth century, so too did the Brethren undergo change. A progressive trend not only compelled the Brethren to rethink many of the attitudes and practices of their closed community, it also caused them to evangelize. The Second District of the German Baptist Brethren Church thus embarked on an evangelism campaign to areas "in need" in the last decade of the nineteenth century.

Directed by the Board of the Brethren, meetings were held in Grant County, West Virginia and in Orange, Madison, Green, Bath, Highland, and King William Counties and in the city of Staunton, Virginia. D. C. Flory, undoubtedly influenced by this new trend, made it his mission to drive from his home in New Hope to Staunton to preach. Under his leadership and the direction of elders Samuel Driver, Enoch Brower, L. A. Wenger, and Noah Fisher, a Sunday school was organized on November 1, 1896. A number of individuals, some of whom were residents of Staunton, met in the Oddfellows Hall on Main Street (today E. Beverley Street) to hear Brother Flory preach twice each Sunday. He was aided in his efforts by Sister Temple Sauble, a missionary sent by the district, who visited members during the week and distributed tracts to attract new members. A prayer meeting was also organized at the time.

As an unorganized church, business meetings were not held and no minutes were kept as a result. By 1898, however, it was reported to the district by the Church Election and Missionaries Committee that ninety-eight people, forty of whom were from the city of Staunton, regularly met and that eight of the members had been baptized. It also appears that the Oddfellows Hall no longer met the physical needs of the fledgling congregation. The soon-to-be church had purchased a lot on the corner of Churchville and Central Avenue for the sum of \$750 with an eye toward constructing a meetinghouse.

A committee composed of elders from the neighboring churches of Barron Ridge, Elk Run, and Mt. Vernon, voted the German Baptist Brethren Church of Staunton into existence on May 20, 1898. Its nineteen brethren and twenty sisters unanimously agreed to cooperate in the work of the new church and they elected Levi Wenger the presiding officer, John Kennedy as secretary, and J. M. Steffy treasurer. George, and Samuel Flory of Mt. Vernon, Samuel Huffman and Joseph Crickenberger of Barron Ridge, Issac Miller and John Rawlson of Elk Run, and J. W. Steffy and J. P. Jordan of Staunton then "withdrew to locate the boundary line" for the Staunton Church. Those boundaries ran:

...about two miles south of Staunton along the Waynesboro Road to Brands Mill. From the mill west up Christians Creek to Harpen-Harmans then across to Jacob Shaners on the Lexington Road. From there across to G. W. Englemans between the Middlebrook and Lexington Road. From Englemans to Capt. E. A. Fulchers on the Middlebrook Road. Then straight across to Hebron Church. From there across to Stanley's store on the Parkersburg Pike. From there to Dr. Blairs on the Churchville road then a straight line from Dr. Blairs on Churchville Road across by Fultz place to the School House on Valley Pike. From school house on V. Pike across B&O RR by the big trestle by Wm. Glenns place and on across by McClears farm to Brands Mill. Making a complete circle of about two miles from Staunton around.

Thus established, the congregation turned its attention to construction of a church house in September 1898. The Beaver Creek Congregation contributed \$47.45 to the new church which was used to pay indebtedness on the Oddfellows Hall rent. Subscriptions totaling \$802 were reported for the building fund. The business meeting decided then to build a brick church thirty-five by fifty-two feet. J. P. Jordan, who had been elected the first deacon of the church, along with Brother Kennedy were selected to secure plans for the new church.

Whatever the good brothers learned and subsequently reported about building costs is unknown, but at a special meeting held the following week, the members of the church voted for a frame house to be not less than thirty-five by fifty-two feet. The church also voted to apply for a \$300 loan from the General Mission Board to help build the church. A loan for that amount was forthcoming the following winter from the General Missionary Tract Committee. The church secured the loan with the deed of trust to the property. It was decided that gas fixtures would be installed in the new building.

While construction on the meetinghouse progressed, the brethren and sisters settled down to the work of the church. Delegates were elected to both the district and annual conference. The congregation sent a paper to the district

meeting disapproving of cigarettes and asking the district to approve the Staunton church organization. D. C. Flory was selected minister on February 11, 1899. New members, Sister Graham and her son and daughter and Sister G. W. Sprouse among them, joined the church. J. P. Jordan was elected Sunday School superintendent.

A finance committee was created, made up of Brothers Jordan, Deihl, Fraust, and Kennedy. It was decided that all the money of the church would go through the hands of that committee. They were also given the authority to fix up the church yard.

Money, ministers, attendance, and congregational strife created challenges for the churches leaders and their flock. Brothers Wenger and Jordan were appointed to a committee to visit the brethren "who did not attend church regular." The committee subsequently visited a number of those members whose attendance had lapsed, who were no longer in love or union with the church, or who had displayed unbecoming conduct. Results of all visits were duly reported to council meetings. It appears a number of brethren and sisters were out of fellowship.

Brother and Sister Wilkerson, two of the founding members, provide a colorful illustration. The Wilkersons had stopped attending church. A committee of two headed by Brother Garber paid the Wilkersons a visit. After speaking with Brother Wilkerson (the council minutes noted that the committee was unable to speak with Sister Wilkerson), it was learned that the couple was not in fellowship with Brother Sprouse whom they criticized for sporting a mustache but not a beard. The committee struggled to bring the parties back into fellowship with each other—Sprouse explained to Brother Garber and the committee that "his mustache protected his lungs from dust but he agreed to let his beard grow." The contention, however, dragged on for nearly two years when the minutes abruptly note that "the case of Brother and Sister Wilkerson has been settled satisfactorily to them and the church."

The young church also was having trouble meeting its hall rent. It was decided to spend money from the subscriptions for the rent and to pay out no more than \$10 for coffins "for those not able to pay for themselves." Eventually the church asked the district board for an additional \$10 a month to pay for the running expenses of the church. Brother Steffy was appointed to solicit funds for further improvements on the church property. In October 1899 it was reported that the cash on hand was forty-four cents after paying a debt for stoves and an amount owed the janitor.

When D. C. Flory resigned as minister in August 1899 it became necessary to find a new minister to locate in Staunton. Brothers Wenger, Steffy and Kennedy were appointed to a search committee. Brother Hoover was unanimously voted upon as minister. A subscription to pay his monthly expenses and support was taken. For whatever reason, Brother Hoover did not come to the Staunton church. The search committee reported to the business meeting held on February 10, 1900 that they had been unable to secure anyone. Brother Steffy further reported that he had been unable to get anyone to hold a series of meetings. It was decided that the committee should continue its search. The services of J. M. Mohler were secured to preach at a series of meetings in 1901. Jacob C. Garber, who lived along Churchville Avenue, also preached in the interim. Eventually

area churches sent temporary appointments to fill the pulpit.

The issue of an unfilled pulpit was finally resolved in January 1902 when the church unanimously elected Brother Jacob C. Garber as the church's first resident minister. In April, Brother and Sister Garber had their membership officially moved from the Barren Ridge congregation.

Despite what must have seemed like some real obstacles, the church grew physically and spiritually. The Sister's Aid Society, the first women's group, was created in February 1900 with Sisters Steffy, Shumate, Deihl, Greaver, Michael, and Nettie Greaver appointed as officers of the society. The council appropriated enough money to purchase three dozen "of the small size new Brethren hymnals" for the use of the church. The first communion meeting was held in the fall of 1900 and the first Wednesday in October was selected as the appointed day for all future communions. Frank Deihl was elected a deacon of the church. Delegates attended district and annual meetings. The church also voted to hold council meetings each quarter. The first men's group emerged in 1903 when a Christian Workers Society was organized with J. W. Garber appointed president, B. C. Harman, secretary, and J. S. Hall, treasurer.

It is not noted in the council minutes when the congregation finished the structure at the corner of Churchville and Central Avenues. Clues, however, indicate that perhaps the congregation moved into their meetinghouse by February 1899 when Brother Michael was selected sexton of the church and Brother Kennedy was asked to have gas fixtures put in "our new church." In August 1899 the finance committee was given the authority to fix up the church yard, an activity that is mentioned again in 1902. Stoves were purchased in October of 1899 for the sum of \$11.

Catherine Wilkerson, born in November 1896, attended Sunday school and preaching in this small building as a young girl. She recalled "everything went on in that one little room—meetings, preaching, Sunday school." Baptisms were conducted in the pond at Gypsy Hill Park to which the entire congregation and the baptismal candidate would walk. She recalled that J. C. Garber lived along Churchville Avenue between the church and the pond. The newly baptized were wrapped in a white robe and the congregation would walk to his house following the baptism for a meal and fellowship.

Eventually the church must have proved to be inadequate. In November 1903 the church considered buying the United Brethren Church located on Lewis Street when that congregation built a new church on West Beverley Street (until recently St. Paul's United Methodist Church). Money also continued to be a problem for the brethren. The church sent delegates to the district meeting in 1904, but did not have the funds to send representatives to the annual meeting. It was decided in February 1904 to take up a collection on the first Sunday of each month. The first collection yielded seventy-four cents. In April, Brother Joe Garber was appointed to solicit members for money for running expenses of the church. Faced with what appears to be a real lack of financial support, the church council learned that the United Brethren agreed to take \$3,000 for their church. The council minutes once again are silent about the move to the Lewis Street Church. It was decided in July to press the collections for the paying of "this church." The council also decided to hold communion in the auditorium and to buy paper for the floor.

Jacob Garber remained as minister of the church, however, it appears all was not well. In June of 1905 a special council meeting was called and Garber was re-elected for another year. The integrity of the meeting was called into question, necessitating an investigation by a committee of five elders, none of whom could come from Augusta County. The committee reprimanded several church members for willfulness and overzealousness, and recommended that the brethren and sisters of the Staunton Church "be kindly affectioned toward each other and that they labor for union and love forgetting the things that are behind and reaching forward unto those things which are before, press toward the mark of the prize in the high calling in Christ Jesus."

The church's wounds did not heal quickly. Communion was suspended indefinitely. Jacob Garber resigned shortly thereafter and the church decided to elect a new minister. On October 12, 1906 Brother Walter Thomas received the call. It was decided at that time to resume communion. The church thus returned to its ordinary rhythms.

The march of ministers continued. Noah Fisher was elected in July 1907. He was followed by A. B. Miller, Casper Driver, E. S. Coffman, George A. Phillips, S. D. Glick, Dee H. Miller, and D. L. Andes. On May 15, 1911 a committee was authorized to borrow \$250 to defray the expenses of the church and to purchase 1,000 envelopes to distribute to adjoining and other churches who propose to contribute to assist finances for the pastor's salary. Interestingly, this entry of May 15 is the first time the church is referred to as the Church of the Brethren of Staunton, Virginia.

To add to the church's financial woes, a late afternoon storm that perhaps spawned a tornado seriously damaged the church when it ripped off the roof on Sunday, June 4, 1911. The trustees and the council met on June 6 at the Y.M.C.A. and decided to continue services and appoint a committee of two to find a temporary place to meet. Subscriptions were taken to pay for the re-roofing of the church.

In March of 1913 and again in April of 1914 the Staunton Church sent a query to the Second District of Virginia to formulate some plan by which the work in Staunton "may be continued." It appears the church was barely meeting its "running expenses" and it asked the district to supply the ministerial help. In October 1914 the church adopted an envelope system for collecting money. Sisters Catherine Wilkerson and Mary Deihl and Brother David Gilbert served on the committee that instituted this change in collection.

The first of three missionaries arrived from Bridgewater College in the summer of 1914. Catherine Wilkerson recalled that the missionaries were often sent to Brethren churches, sometimes when the churches were between ministers, to do whatever church work needed to be done. They visited the sick and often organized women's activities at a time when any organized women's groups had been forbidden.

According to Miss Wilkerson, all three of the missionaries came from Bridgewater and lived with various church families. One in particular, Nelly Wampler, visited the sick as well as taught the children how to quilt. "She had the children of the church sew the squares and the women of the church pieced the squares together," Miss Wilkerson recalled. The quilts were then sold to support the building fund.

Elected ministers and missionary sisters, however, proved inadequate to fill the needs of the Staunton congregation. In a letter petitioning the Mission Board

to grant a permanent resident minister, the comment was made that a minister "filling appointments each Sunday and not in touch with the work of the church constantly resulted in many missed opportunities." The church promised to pay the pastor \$600 a year. This was a tall promise from a church that reported \$22.86 in the treasury in April 1916. The Mission Board agreed with the request of the church. Representatives from the church worked closely with the Mission Board but with little success. In June of 1918 the Mission Board suggested the church try to find its own pastor with the Mission Board promising financial support of \$25 a month for the pastor's salary.

Casper Garber recalled in his memoirs that a man named Walter Harris, who was secretary of the Mission Board, came to see his parents John Cline and Stella Houff Garber, who were at the time serving a church in Buena Vista. Brother Harris asked them to consider the Staunton Church. Brother and Sister Garber's experience in Buena Vista had been one of financial hardship and they hesitated. Brother Harris told them that the church in Staunton was foundering and Brother Garber would be the district's last effort to keep the church alive. If he did not succeed, they would close the church and recommend the members go to other churches.

The Garbers agreed to move to Staunton, where they would farm and minister. Brother Garber preached his first sermon at the Staunton church on December 1, 1918. The arrival of Brother Garber signaled a change in the fortunes and life of the Staunton church. He gave his life to the Staunton Church of the Brethren, remaining there as pastor until 1947 and thus gave it the stability it needed to grow and thrive. The Church celebrated its 50th Anniversary in 1946. Brother Garber left the Staunton church in 1947 stronger than he had found it. The Brethren had established their presence in Staunton. Soon the congregation outgrew the Lewis Street Church.

A decade later, a plot of land was purchased on North Coalter Street on which the present-day church was built and dedicated in 1959. Demographic shifts in the Brethren population occurred nationwide during the 1960s and 1970s. This shift swelled the congregations of urban Brethren churches while the ranks of rural churches declined dramatically. This certainly describes the trend at the Staunton Church, which experienced a peak growth in the mid-1970s.

After some unsettled years in the mid-1980s that resulted in a slight decline in numbers and a reduction of programs, the Staunton Church of the Brethren is today a service-oriented congregation ministering to its members and contributing to the life of the community. It celebrated its Centennial in 1996 with the prayer that it continues the work of Jesus Christ simply, peacefully, and together.



Vacancies in the Mansion of Goodness — Women and Crime in Colonial Augusta County, Virginia

by

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*Lo! yonder she walketh in Maiden Sweetness; with
Innocence in her Minde and Modesty on her Cheek...
Virtue attendeth at her right hand...Her Breast is the
Mansion of Goodness...*¹

Diversity characterized the American colonies in the mid- to late-1700s. The *Virginia Gazette's* idealized description of womankind by no means accurately portrayed colonial women. Similarly, crime and punishment derived from English common law differed significantly in different areas. Laws also applied dissimilarly to different groups within colonial society. The laws of colonial America reflected widely held societal views. That historical studies of female criminals are nearly nonexistent is unfortunate. Treatment of women lawbreakers in colonial America is indicative of the diversity of the ways in which colonists dealt with crime. Southern and Northern colonies defined crimes by women differently and meted out a wide array of punishments based on their various experiences. An examination of women and crime in colonial Virginia provides a look at the way one colony treated its feminine lawbreakers. More specifically, study of these women in colonial Augusta County during the 1740s, 50s, and 60s affords a valuable insight into female crime and punishment in the colony of Virginia.

During the colonial period in Augusta County, the Court, the Church Vestry, and numerous concerned citizens accused women of a wide variety of crimes. These offenses ranged from the commonplace, such as fornication, to the relatively rare, such as murder. Those women who were found guilty consequently met with various punishments calculated by the court to suit the crimes committed. Women's crimes in colonial Augusta County are divisible into two categories: those of a religious or moral nature, and those which directly threatened individuals within the society. Of these two types of crime, records of crimes against specific individuals are considerably less numerous than accounts of religious and moral offenses.

¹*Virginia Gazette*, February 20, 1752, Number 60. 2.

Crimes against individuals constituted those crimes that remain crimes today. The court minutes of Augusta County record instances involving theft, jail-breaking, house-burning, physical abuse, and even murder. Although women in colonial Augusta County were accused and convicted of far fewer crimes than men, women were at least accused of all these serious crimes. In 1780, for example, a Negro slave woman was convicted of burning her master's house and sentenced to death by hanging, after which her head was cut off and placed on a pole near Staunton as a warning to renegade slaves.² Such punishment, however, was usually reserved for slaves, male or female, rather than female criminals in general.

The experiences of women accused of theft in Augusta County are more typical of female criminals. In the case of a suspected theft, the court determined guilt or innocence, and then decided the punishment based on the value of the goods stolen. On March 18, 1762, Ann Williams, convicted of stealing £100, was sent to jail in Williamsburg to await further trial there. Her male accomplice met the same fate.³ Julian Mahoney, who stole a gold ring in 1760, received thirty-nine lashes for her crime, while Damsel Montgomery, convicted on the same day of "her Felonious taking Two pair of Shoes the Property of James Leaster," atoned for her relatively minor theft with only ten lashes.⁴

In fact, the Augusta County Court seldom hesitated to pass the sentence of corporal punishment for both men and women. The punishment for theft in colonial Augusta County was thirty-nine lashes dutifully administered by the sheriff at the public whipping-post.⁵ Unless she had stolen something extremely valuable, however, as in the case of Julian Mahoney, a woman seldom received the full punishment. Most, like Damsel Montgomery, received less than the proscribed thirty-nine lashes. While men invariably met with this punishment, the court carefully suited the physical punishment of women to the extent of the thefts they committed.

In the case of serious theft or crimes such as murder, a woman or man found guilty in the Augusta County Courthouse faced not necessarily punishment, but further trial in the General Court in Williamsburg, as in the case of the previously mentioned Ann Williams. Although she confessed to receiving stolen goods, she denied the theft, but was nevertheless found guilty and jailed until she could be tried in Williamsburg.⁶ Similarly, the court found Mary Gray, a servant woman, guilty of the murder of her illegitimate child, and sentenced her to further trial in Williamsburg.⁷ Tracing the fates of criminals sent to Williamsburg is difficult, but punishments there were harsh, and even robbers and felons, both male and female, were commonly executed if found guilty in the General Court.⁸ The *Virginia Gazette* records numerous instances of crime and

²Lyman Chalkley, *Chronicles of the Scotch-Irish Settlement in Virginia*, vol. 1 (Baltimore: Genealogical Publishing Co. Inc., 1974). 212.

³Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 7. 205.

⁴Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 6. 461.

⁵J. Lewis Peyton, *History of Augusta County, Virginia* (Harrisonburg: Carrier, 1985). 39.

⁶Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 7. 205.

⁷Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 4. 189.

⁸J. A. Osborne, *Williamsburg in Colonial Times* (Richmond: Dietz, 1935). 5-6.

punishment, including the fate of John Mace, who stole a horse, and Elizabeth Blair, also a convicted felon, "who were try'd and convicted. This General Court receiv'd Sentence of Death."⁹

The number of thefts and other serious crimes committed by women in colonial Augusta County was fairly low. "The greatest number of crimes committed by women were of a religious or moral nature. Gossip and slander were punishable by law. As with theft, few instances of such crimes exist in the available county records. The typical slander case was similar to that of Anne Brown:

Anne Brown wife of James Brown having come into Court and abused William Wilson Gent. one of the justices for this County by calling him a Rogue and that on his coming of the Bench she would give it to him with the Devil, It is Therefore Ordered that the Sherif take her into custody there to remain untill she find Security for her good Behaviour.¹⁰ The charge of abuse, when brought against a woman, meant slander or gossip. The woman guilty of such a verbal crime faced imprisonment until she could pay a fine, referred to in the Court records as "Security."

The court determined whether a woman had broken a moral law, but the church was often responsible for carrying out the punishment. In May 1749, according to Augusta Parish Vestry records, both Sarah Simmons and Elizabeth Black were fined for the moral crime of fornication. The following year, Margret Frazer was fined for adultery. The research of John Logan Anderson indicates the importance of the Established Anglican Church in punishing crime. According to Anderson, one of the initial functions of the Established Church in Virginia was to govern the morals of society. By the 1700s, however, the church's duties had become increasingly secular. One of the major functions of the church was to bind out illegitimate children and orphans.¹¹

A wide variety of moral offenses were punishable by law during Virginia's colonial period. A woman found guilty of "not being able to bring [her child] up in a Christian like manner" might lose that child to the vestry, who would then bind the child out as an apprentice or servant.¹² Men met with this punishment more frequently than women, as men, not women, had legal control of their children. Women accused of improper childrearing were primarily widows.

By far the most prevalent offense by women in colonial Augusta County was of a moral nature. In the case of a woman who gave birth to an illegitimate child, the court and vestrymen cooperated in convicting and punishing her. Bastardy was common among both servants and non-servants, but the two groups of women were treated very differently for the same offense.

As Victoria E. Bynum notes in *Unruly Women*, the role of mother was the highest position in colonial society that the average woman could acceptably

achieve, but motherhood outside of marriage represented the lowest level to which a woman could sink.¹³ Augusta County colonial law upheld this ideology. A woman in the county who bore a child outside of wedlock faced appearance in court, ostracization, and ultimately the loss of her child. Proceedings in such a case began with a complaint by the vestry to the court that a woman had given birth to a bastard child. The Court then ordered that the vestry bind out the illegitimate child as an apprentice or indentured servant. Thus women were punished by having their children taken from them. In the rare case when the father of the child was identified, he, not the mother, was given the right to bind the child out as he saw fit. John Stevenson, proven the father of an illegitimate child in 1756, was allowed by the court to bind out his child by Isabella Dunting.¹⁴ In cases of bastardy, the court gave fathers complete control over the fates of their children, while the mothers of those children were punished.

Details of the sale of illegitimate children, for such the practice essentially was, appear in the vestry records of Augusta Parish. The vestry bound out female children until the age of eighteen and males until the age of twenty-one. Mulatto children met with different treatment, testifying to the stigma attached to biracial sexual unions. The vestry records for September 1748 recount the all-too-typical case of Christopher Rearkey, a mulatto boy one year and three months of age, who was bound out until the age of thirty-one, ten years longer than if he had been white.¹⁵ Mothers of mulatto children also met with harsher treatment than mothers of white children. Servant women faced even greater penalties for having children out of wedlock. Cases identical to that of Ann Cronan appear throughout the court records. For example,

On the motion of the Reverend John Jones seting forth that his servant woman Ann Cronan had been delivered of a bastard child in his House and she appearing in Court and confesing the fact it is ordered that for the trouble of his house she serve him twelve months after her present time by Indenture or otherwise is expired.¹⁶

A servant who bore a "bastard child" could expect to meet with the same fate as Ann Cronan. Additional penalties were possible as well for servant women who committed the moral crime of fornication out of wedlock. Mary Shepard, who not only gave birth to an illegitimate child, but contracted a venereal disease which cost her master £5 to cure, was ordered to serve him one year "for the trouble of his house," and a full second year for his trouble in curing her.¹⁷ Treatment of female servants was harsh in general. Margaret Farrell, a servant who registered a complaint against her master, received "at the Publick Whiping Post of this County Twenty five lashes on her back well Laid on" for her audacity when the court determined that she had accused him falsely.¹⁸

The colonial definition of "orphan" presents problems in determining exactly how many bastard children were born to women during the colonial

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 4. 219.

¹¹John Logan Anderson, "The Presbyterians and Augusta Parish, 1738-1757: A Political and Social Analysis" (Master's thesis, University of Virginia, 1985). 93-94, 110, 279.

¹²Chalkley, 212.

¹³Victoria E. Bynum, *Unruly Women* (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1992). 2.

¹⁴Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 5. 300.

¹⁵Anderson, 104.

¹⁶Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 7. 125.

¹⁷Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 6. 482.

¹⁸Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 7. 297.

period in Augusta County. The definition is telling in regard to the status of women in general during the period. The term "orphan" described a child whose father was either deceased or not married to the child's mother.¹⁹ It is impossible to accurately estimate how many of the hundreds of "orphans" mentioned in Augusta County records were actually illegitimate children because true orphans, like bastard children, were bound out at an early age.

Another legal judgement of a moral nature often levied on women was not technically a crime but was punished as one. Instances of women fined for being of "evil fame" or "ill behaviour" occur throughout the court records. Ann Harling, tried in 1756 for breaking and entering and theft, was found innocent of those crimes but was ruled by the court to be "a person of Evil fame." Her court-determined reputation of "Evil fame" earned her thirty-nine lashes at the public whipping-post and a fine referred to as "Security for good behaviour."²⁰ Another woman, Rosanna Ralston, appears not to have even been accused of a crime, but was

Committed to the Goal of this County for having refused to give security for her good behaviour...the Court...are of the Opinion that the Sherif take her again into Custody there to remain untill she find Two Securitys...in the Sum of Twenty five pounds Each for her good behaviour.²¹

The security fine was particularly harsh for women, as most did not possess sufficient money to pay such a fine. Catherine McGinnis, "committed to the Goal of this County for not being of Good behaviour," could not pay her security and was eventually released from jail on the condition that she leave Augusta County within ten days.²²

The experiences of female lawbreakers in colonial Augusta County provide a fairly accurate microcosm of the crimes and punishments of women in the colony of Virginia. Bastardy, the most common crime of women in colonial Augusta County, was classified as fornication. Most crimes committed by women in the colony of Virginia fell under this category. For such a crime, a Virginia woman could be whipped or fined,²³ as some women in Augusta County were. Most mothers of illegitimate children in the Southern colonies, including Virginia, underwent the appropriation of their children by the courts. Women whose sexual behavior did not conform to religious mores faced a variety of laws regarding fornication, bastardy, and even prostitution, as well as the presumed right of the court to apprentice children whose mothers were deemed immoral and therefore incapable of childrearing.²⁴ Bynum argues that, in general, the all-male governments of the South controlled the sexual behavior of women much more carefully than did governments in the North. She

supports this view by pointing out that in the biracial society of the South, women were entrusted with the dubious moral task of maintaining racial purity.²⁵ Bynum's view adds insight to the fact that mulatto children and their mothers faced harsher punishments than white illegitimate children and their mothers in colonial Augusta County.

Although other offenses by women were much less common than bastardy in Augusta County, those on record also point to the validity of the county as a microcosm for the colony of Virginia. Suzanne Lebsock, in her portrait of Virginian women through the centuries, notes that women had greater freedom in the 1600s than in the 1700s.²⁶ Apparently, however, even in the eighteenth century Virginia women found greater leniency in the law than women in Northern colonies. According to Alice Morse Earle, Virginia women received more merciful treatment than other colonial women. Earle points out that women who failed to attend church were not punished, whereas men guilty of the same behavior faced anywhere from a week to a year of community service.²⁷

Augusta County's leniency toward some crimes by females is illustrated by the trial of Jane Erwin in 1767 for "keeping a Disorderly house." The term "Disorderly house," like that of "orphan," was vaguely defined. A woman suspected of prostitution, a term that might mean some behavior as innocent by modern standards as interracial social interaction, was often brought up on charges of keeping a disorderly house.²⁸ The court fined Jane Erwin. In a later session, however, the court determined that she had not had sufficient "Legal Notice of the said Presentment and that she did keep a Reputable and Orderly house." Furthermore, the court took measures for Jane Erwin's protection: "It is Ordered by the Court that his Excellency the Governour be Certified hereof and that the Court does for the Strongest Reasons adjudge that the said Jane Erwin is a proper Object of his Honours Clemency and Mercy."²⁹

The crime of slander presents another example of Augusta County leniency. Colonial men convicted of slander generally were placed in the stocks, while women faced punishment in the ducking-stool, the preferred punishment in Virginia.³⁰ Every county courthouse in colonial Virginia was required by a law made in 1705 to have a whipping-post, stocks, a pillory, and a ducking-stool. Augusta County erected a ducking-stool in 1747, just two years after the county was formed.³¹ Virginia courts in general evidenced a great deal of leniency in the use of this device. Virginian Grace Sherwood was tried for witchcraft in 1706. She faced ducking as a means of extracting a confession, but as the day set for the event was rainy, the court feared that ducking in such inclement weather would endanger her health. They postponed the ducking, and, when Grace Sherwood's trial finally took place, she was not convicted, despite the evidence against her.³²

¹⁹Ibid., 2.

²⁰Lebsock, 45.

²¹Alice Morse Earle, *Colonial Dames and Good Wives* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1988). 98-99.

²²Bynum, 93.

²³Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 11. 217.

²⁴Earle, 91-93.

²⁵Peyton, 55.

²⁶Earle, 102. Earle notes that Grace Sherwood floated when thrown in water, indicating that she was a witch, but that she was nonetheless found innocent of the crime of witchcraft.

¹⁹Bynum, 99-100.

²⁰Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 5. 303.

²¹Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 6. 212.

²²Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 5. 126.

²³Suzanne Lebsock, *A Share of Honour: Virginia Women 1600-1945* (Richmond: Best Products Foundation, 1985). 23.

²⁴Bynum, 90.

The witchcraft hysteria that swept across New England in the colonial period failed to take root in the Southern colonies. Witchcraft was regarded as criminal in Augusta County, and in Virginia,³³ but J. Lewis Peyton's *History of Augusta County* mentions only two women suspected of witchcraft in the county. Mary Greenlee was accused of witchcraft, but was never brought to trial.³⁴ Mrs. James Hagerty, the other suspected witch, likewise escaped legal proceedings.³⁵ These two women provide examples of two more characteristics of female crime and punishment in colonial Augusta County that are representative of Virginia and other Southern colonies.

Mary Greenlee was not merely a suspected witch. In fact, she appears frequently in the Augusta County Court records. Throughout the mid- to late-1700s, Mary Greenlee's name is a common one in cases involving land disputes. In addition, an indentured servant named Nat, who the records describe both as an Indian and as a mulatto, petitioned the court for nearly a year to grant him his freedom, complaining that Mary was detaining him unlawfully. The court eventually decided that Nat was a free man.³⁶

Other women's names occur and reoccur frequently throughout the colonial records. The vestry records of Augusta Parish for 1747 record the punishment of Catherine Quin, "a Lewed Woman," for giving birth to a child out of wedlock. She was sentenced to whipping.³⁷ The same year, she was charged with petty larceny.³⁸ Nine years later, Catherine Quin was still causing trouble. Jailed on suspicion "of aiding and assisting in the Breaking of the Goal of this County," she was brought before the Court. A verdict of "not guilty" did not stop the court from meting out justice to this "Lewed Woman." The members of the court found her to be "a person of Ill behaviour. It is therefore Ordered that she be Committed to the Goal of this County there to remain until she enter into recognizance for her good behaviour for a year & day now next Coming in the sum of Twenty Pounds with two Securities in the Sum of Ten Pounds Each."³⁹

The case of the second suspected witch, Mrs. James Hagerty, illustrates yet another tendency in the legal treatment of women in Augusta County and in the colony of Virginia. Mrs. Hagerty was extremely poor—so poor that often she could not afford to feed her children. This destitute woman provided residents of the town of Staunton with a scapegoat for every disaster from bad weather to serious illness and crop blights.⁴⁰ Certainly not all poor women functioned as scapegoats for their communities. An economic connection to crime and punishment persisted throughout the colony of Virginia, however. Bynum suggests that this connection was typical of Southern colonies in general. In slaveholding areas, poverty was associated with slaves and was unfeminine. Therefore, poor women were considered degraded. According to Bynum, poor white women and free black

women were more likely than wealthier women to offend the male-dominated courts of colonial North Carolina.⁴¹ The Augusta County Court minutes of the mid-1700s show no record of the existence of free black women in the county, however, many of the women accused of various crimes were poor.

Crime and punishment of women in colonial Augusta County are representative of the colony of Virginia in several ways. Augusta County's female lawbreakers tended to commit moral crimes, particularly fornication, more often than crimes against other individuals. This pattern of moral crime and the diversity of crimes committed by women reflects that of colonial Virginia society as a whole. Servants and poor women in Augusta County, like their peers throughout Virginia, faced harsher punishments than other women, who were generally treated with more leniency than were men.

The treatment of female lawbreakers in colonial Augusta County also reveals a great deal about the place of women in colonial society. Women seldom owned property, even a woman's child was not her own to raise if the court deemed her unfit by virtue of her moral character or her financial situation. *The Lady's New Year's Gift, or, Advice to a Daughter*, accurately expresses the prevailing colonial view of the status of women, and, by extension, of the position of the women who dared to step outside the law:

You must first lay it down for a Foundation in general, That there is *Inequality* in the *Sexes*, and that for the better Oeconomy of the World, the *Men*, who were to be the Law Givers, had the better share of *Reason* bestow'd upon them; by which means your Sex it the better prepar'd for...*Compliance*.⁴²

The place of women was to obey, and many did. There were, however, vacancies in the "Mansion of Goodness." As is so often the case, the exceptions help to prove the rule. An examination of the treatment of female criminals provides significant insight into the place of women within colonial society.

³³Ibid., 102.

³⁴Peyton, 68.

³⁵Ibid., 166-67.

³⁶Chalkley, 193-198.

³⁷Anderson, 101.

³⁸Chalkley, 25.

³⁹Augusta County Courthouse Records, Order Book No. 5. 116.

⁴⁰Peyton, 166-67.

⁴¹Bynum, 10.

⁴²qtd. in Lebsack. 44.

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
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A Fishersville Wedding, 1900


Sometimes short vignettes of the past help local history come alive and make our ancestors more than just names on a piece of paper.

Freda P. McCune of Fishersville has provided the historical society with just such a glimpse into life one hundred years ago. The 1900 newspaper clipping of a Fishersville wedding tells part of the story. Adding to the story are the family photographs and the genealogy supplied by Mrs. McCune. The happy story of the wedding of Florence Coiner to Melvin McCune was short-lived. The couple had three sons, Gordan Alexander (born January



15, 1901), Vernon Coiner (born May 10, 1904), and Clifton Melvin (born March 29, 1910). Tragically, however, Florence died of tuberculosis on August 1, 1915. She was 26 years old on her wedding day, and just 41 years old when she died.

THE HAPPY COUPLE—Henry Melvin McCune and his new wife Florence Camilla Coiner McCune.



SCENE OF THE WEDDING—This Fishersville home, which is no longer standing, was the scene of the 1900 wedding between Florence C. Coiner and H. Melvin McCune. The house was the home of the brides' mother, L. Caroline (Keiser) Coiner. The bride's father, James David Coiner, was deceased at the time of the wedding. The farmhouse was located at Long Meadows on Route 608 near Fishersville. It was eventually torn down by Frank Dotson.



HONEYMOON TRIP—At 2:50 p.m. on March 28, 1900, the newlyweds boarded the train in Fishersville while the wedding party watched. After a honeymoon trip to the northern cities, the couple moved into the Fishersville home of the groom's father, A. G. McCune.

McCune-Coiner

Special to the News.

FISHERSVILLE, Va, March 28, (1900)—The home of Mrs. James D. Coiner was this morning the scene of a marriage the memory of which will long linger with those so fortunate as to be present when her daughter, Miss Florence C., placed in the keeping of H. Melvin McCune her future happiness. The handsome parlors had been lavishly decorated with potted plants, whose sweet perfume lent added charm to the surroundings of fairy-like beauty. At 10:30 sharp the organ, under the skillful touch of Miss Leonora Coiner, broke forth in that gladsome song of songs, "The Wedding March," and the bridal party entered the room in the following order: Miss Esther Long with Arthur Harner, Miss Mattie Weade with Homer Coiner, Miss Mary Freed with Charles Keiser, Miss Christina Keiser with Robert Brand and Miss Lena Miller with Joseph Coiner.

These ladies, gowned in white organdie, with the contrasting effect of the black dress suits of the gentlemen, formed the pathway through which the bride and groom now passed, immediately preceded by Miss Christine Coiner, maid of honor, with Strickler McCune, best man.

On taking their positions at the improvised altar the Rev. F. O. Cronk, of St. James' church, in the solemn and impressive ritual of the Lutheran church, bound together these two lives into whose hearts cupid had shot his never-failing shaft in their childhood days and completed the sweet romance of their love's young dream.

The bride is a daughter of the late James David Coiner, one of the most

prosperous and influential farmers this section has ever known. The groom is the only son of A. G. McCune, one of our wealthiest and most prosperous farmers, and is himself a young man of sterling character and indomitable energy. We rejoice that the bride, whose charming personality has made her a universal favorite, has chosen one of our own boys and has not been lost to us, as has so many of our brightest girls in the past few years. The happy couple took the 2:50 p.m. train at Fishersville for a trip to the northern cities. On their return they will live with the groom's father, A. G. McCune, who depends upon his son to manage all of his business interests.



SOME TIME LATER—The family posed for this group shot with Florence and Melvin McCune and their first two children. Melvin is holding his second son, Vernon Coiner who was born in 1904, on his lap while his eldest son, Gordon Alexander who was born in 1901, is seated at the front of the group. Florence is the woman on the far right in the front row.



"We have Been Pretty Badly Whipped":

An Analysis of the Formation and Performance of Upper Shenandoah Valley Home Guard Units in 1864

A History Honors Thesis

by Midshipman First Class David Mark Houff, Class of 1991
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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the formation and combat performance of regional home guard units in the 1864 campaign in the upper Shenandoah Valley. It focuses on two individual units: Colonel Kenton W. Harper's and Colonel William H. Harman's regiments of reserves which were recruited in response to Union operations in the region in May and June 1864. The work gives a brief introduction to the strategic situation in the war in 1864 and progresses through the units' formation and battle experiences. The main vehicle for the analysis is a study of the final action of the campaign, The Battle of Piedmont, June 5, 1864. Major findings of the paper include an evaluation of the motivations and perceptions of the citizens and men in the units in 1864. These perceptions are compared to pre-war biases to examine the changing attitudes of a unique political area. The tactical performance of the local forces is also evaluated with an emphasis on home defense units in general.

Acknowledgements

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14 December 1990

We Have Been Pretty Badly Whipped,
An Analysis of the Formation and Performance of Upper Shenandoah Valley
Home Guard Units in 1864

The Shenandoah Valley was of critical importance to the military planners of both the Union and Confederacy during the American Civil War. Beginning with the commencement of hostilities in April, 1861, the Valley's agricultural and industrial production was a major target for Union forces. Top Union military leaders made the Valley the objective of offensives in both 1862 and 1864. The 1864 campaign, however, was unique: the Valley was the only part of the Confederacy facing an imminent threat of Union occupation without the protection of a sizable force of Confederate army troops. This lack of manpower forced Confederate commanders to rely on home guard forces composed of teenagers, older men, and those who had refused active service in regular Confederate units previously. Despite the importance of these forces in the overall tactical operations in the Valley in 1864, historians have almost completely ignored them. A complete study of these forces' composition, formation, and performance will provide the historian with a better understanding of the outcome of the 1864 Valley campaign.

The Valley, and especially its upper reaches had been extensively pro-Union and anti-secession in the period immediately preceding Virginia's secession in 1861. Lincoln's decision to reunite forcibly the United States of America and the newly-created Confederate States of America had immediate consequences for upper Valley residents. The perceived Federal threat to Virginia overcame the pre-war biases of many residents and resulted in the enrollment of several Confederate units from the upper Valley. Yet, a significant portion of residents in the region remained opposed to service in the Confederate army. These residents failed to enlist because the Valley was not imminently threatened by Federal forces and they did not wish to fight outside of the Valley. Citizens who chose not to fight against the Union directly either served in local administrative capacities, hired substitutes to take their place in the army, or most defiantly, fled the South.

The desirability of these non-participatory options had almost completely disappeared by the spring of 1864. Confederate military setbacks and Union threats to Valley homes and families placed increasing pressure on local men to join home defense units. Major General David Hunter's reputation for wanton destruction of property made fear an important recruiting tool for local commanders seeking to form units to stop Federal advances. This same fear motivated upper Valley residents who had not enrolled in regular units earlier to join Confederate home guard forces out of personal necessity. These factors provide a powerful demonstration of the effectiveness of fear as a psychological motivator. It becomes even more historically important when one realizes that the upper Valley was able to provide a force of 1,000 men, one-half the total provided in 1861, in the late stages of the war (1864).

Despite the enrollment of large numbers of men, these forces were not successful in defending their homes. The motivation and desire of the men to win is without question; yet, the fact that they were outclassed in terms of equipment, leadership, training, and experience meant that they were less effective than a veteran unit of similar size. The most telling impact of these problems can be seen in the complete

collapse these units suffered during their two exposures to combat. A fundamental argument can be made that the Augusta Reserve Regiments simply did not undergo enough training or actual combat to become an effective fighting organization.

To analyze the creation and performance of the units, it is necessary to focus on a limited geographical portion of the Shenandoah Valley: the upper Valley region. This region's importance and the strategic background of the campaigns for the Valley are needed not only to comprehend the drive to create the units, but also to permit a more detailed analysis of the major action in which the upper Valley reserves participated: the Battle of Piedmont, June 5, 1864.

From the outset of the Civil War in 1861, the Shenandoah Valley was crucial to the Confederate war effort. The region was a major grain and meat producer for the Confederate armies of General Robert E. Lee. Strategically, the Blue Ridge and Allegheny mountains, which formed the Valley, shielded the movements of Confederate troops and provided them with a protected avenue of march into Washington D.C., Maryland, and Pennsylvania. The Valley also offered Union forces a "back door" to Richmond's supply lines. Consequently, if Union troops could control the Valley, they could potentially cut off the flow of all supplies not only to the Confederate capital but also to its defenders.

The Shenandoah Valley can be broken down into two components: the lower Valley and the upper Valley. (Appendix A) The lower Valley begins at Harper's Ferry, where the Shenandoah River empties into the Potomac, and runs southward to the division of the Shenandoah by Massanutten Mountain. The upper Valley extends from Lexington north to New Market, and roughly follows the path of the Shenandoah's tributaries. The major region of interest for both Federal and Confederate actions in the Valley during the Civil War was this upper portion. The upper Valley was important as a food producer and a supply center. Its major town, Staunton, had been designated as a Union objective by President Abraham Lincoln as early as April, 1861.¹ Finally, Staunton served as the western depot for the Virginia Central Railroad, which ran east through Charlottesville to Richmond. This depot allowed the expeditious shipment of the Valley's agricultural products to Richmond and Lee's armies. Staunton also manufactured boots and woolen uniforms for Confederate infantry troops, as well as wagons and carriages for artillery forces.² These factors made the upper Valley a logical focal point for Federal offensives in western Virginia.

Despite Lincoln's focus on the area, the Valley remained free of Union threats in 1861. After the Battle of First Manassas in July, 1861, Union forces reorganized and trained near Washington, while Confederate efforts concentrated on keeping the war's focus in extreme northern Virginia. As a result, it was not possible for Federal forces to challenge seriously the Valley during that year.

In the spring of 1862, Union military leaders sent a 25,000 man army under General Nathaniel Banks into the Shenandoah Valley to create a second tactical front to support General George B. McClellan's moves against Richmond by forcing Lee to deploy forces to protect his Valley supply lines. Staunton and its environs escaped capture during this campaign largely because of the efforts of forces under General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson. Jackson had effectively used maneuver warfare to

¹Marshall Moore Brice, *Conquest of a Valley* (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1965), 5.

²Ibid., 4-5.

blunt Federal thrusts into the upper Valley.³ Fortune again spared the region in 1863. Lee's Gettysburg campaign had drawn Union forces away from the Shenandoah Valley, and thus prevented any type of organized action against Staunton. Consequently, by the beginning of the 1864 campaigning season, the upper Valley was still secure in its role as a leading Confederate supply center.

Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, who assumed control of Union armies in March, 1864, realized the importance of the Shenandoah Valley. Grant had shifted Union strategy toward organized, cohesive, and simultaneous actions in multiple theaters. Grant's plan revolved around major actions in Tennessee and Georgia (General William T. Sherman), in the deep South (General Nathaniel Banks), and in Virginia (General George G. Meade). These operations would exploit the Confederate armies' lack of manpower and would permit Federal forces to disrupt Confederate interstate lines of supply and communication. In Virginia, Grant hoped to attack Lee in the east and drive him against Richmond, while Union forces in the Department of West Virginia would assault the Confederate supply centers in the Shenandoah Valley. Grant believed that this two-pronged approach would ultimately ensure victory either through a direct and overwhelming defeat of Lee on the battlefield or through the eventual starvation of Lee's forces due to a lack of supplies.

Within the Valley, initial operations of the Department of West Virginia began in early May, 1864, under the command of Major General Franz Sigel. Sigel was a German-born immigrant who was appointed for solely political reasons and who had very little knowledge of strategy or tactics. Union Colonel David H. Strother noted that, "There is no doubt of Sigel's appointment to the command of this department[.] [General Henry] Halleck is indignant, but the [German] vote must be secured at all hazards for the government[.] and the sacrifice of West Virginia is a small matter."⁴ Grant ordered Sigel and his 7,000 men to move southward through the Valley with the dual objectives of destroying the upper Valley's agricultural crops and severing the Virginia Central Railroad terminal at Staunton. Sigel's mismanagement of troop dispersal and his inability to concentrate his forces effectively limited his ability to achieve his goal successfully. Sigel's advance up the Valley came to a halt on May 15, 1864, when he was defeated by a 3,500 man Confederate force under the command of Major General John C. Breckinridge at New Market.⁵ Grant was enraged at Sigel's defeat and sought to relieve him of command with Major

General David Hunter. Colonel Strother and other Union officers who had been involved in Sigel's abortive march up the Valley agreed with Grant's move. Strother commented, "We can afford to lose such a battle as New Market to get rid of such a mistake as Major General Sigel."⁶

Hunter assumed command of the Army of West Virginia on May 19, 1864. He received virtually the same orders as Sigel: capture Staunton and disrupt the flow of meat and grain to Confederate troops near Richmond. Moreover, Grant ordered that Hunter take Lynchburg in an attempt to cut off Lee's southern route of escape should Richmond fall. Grant also augmented Union strength in the Valley by 3,000 men, so Hunter would begin his raid with more than 10,000 troops at his disposal.⁷

Hunter began to move south on May 24, 1864, and with the exception of a few minor skirmishes, his army advanced virtually unopposed. Hunter's raid was marked by the extensive burning and pillaging of villages and homes. The General issued an order that made every home of known secessionists or "rebel sympathizers" subject to immediate destruction. He also demanded that reprisal burnings be conducted if partisans responded to Federal attacks in kind. Specifically, he announced that, "the town nearest the scene of such an attack would be burned and the commanding general will cause to be burned every Rebel house within 5 miles of the place of the attack."⁸ These orders rapidly resulted in the complete destruction of at least two lower Valley towns: Newtown and Woodstock. Hunter's advance was halted briefly on June 2, 1864, on the outskirts of Harrisonburg by a small number of Confederate reserve units; Hunter, however, rapidly brushed them aside, occupied the town, and prepared to move south to capture Staunton.

Opposing Hunter's attempts to secure Staunton was Brigadier General John D. Imboden, commander of all regular Confederate forces in the upper Valley and approximately 1,000 Confederate reserve and home guard troops. Imboden, a lifelong Staunton resident, had extensive knowledge of the terrain in the upper Valley and had placed his men in defensive positions along the North River at Mount Crawford (Appendix B). Further, Imboden had requested manpower support from General Lee in Richmond. Lee could not spare any troops from the Army of Northern Virginia, but he did manage to dispatch Brigadier General William E. Jones, commander of the Department of Southwest Virginia, and about 3,000 men to help stop the Federal thrust.⁹ Jones arrived in Staunton on June 4, 1864, to assume command of the forces Imboden had assembled. Jones and Imboden

³Residents of the Staunton area generally enjoyed a calm period after the flurry of activity following secession. Staunton was never threatened in 1861. In 1862, the situation in the upper Valley was never very tense largely because Jackson's campaign centered in the lower Valley near Winchester. The closest action to Staunton in the campaign was at Port Republic, almost 20 miles away from the city.

⁴Cecil D. Eby, Jr., ed. *A Virginia Yankee in the Civil War: The Diaries of David Hunter Strother* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), 213.

⁵Sigel's advance up the Valley was halted largely through the efforts of General John C. Breckinridge and 200 Virginia Military Institute Cadets, who had been rushed to New Market from Lexington, 75 miles south. The cadets made the final charge on the day of the battle, capturing a Union artillery battery under the command of Captain Albert von Kleiser and forcing the retreat of the center of Sigel's line. An excellent account of this event can be found in William C. Davis, *The Battle of New Market*. (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1975). Breckinridge and his force (including the cadets) had been ordered to Lee's lines around Petersburg after New Market and were not available to counter Hunter's operations.

⁶Eby, 215.

⁷Gary C. Walker, *Yankee Soldiers in Virginia Valleys: Hunter's Raid* (Roanoke, Virginia: A&W Enterprises, Inc., 1989), 25; Brice, 13-14.; Eby, 231.

⁸H. A. DuPont, *The Campaign of 1864 in the Valley of Virginia and the Expedition to Lynchburg* (New York: J.J. Little and Ives Company, 1925), 44-45.; Eby, 235-237.; Walker, 35. Some Valley historians have argued that Hunter was merely following the "total war" policy that Grant had adopted; however, forces under Hunter's command had been involved in multiple burnings on the coast of South Carolina in 1862. Interestingly, Hunter had organized the first Black regiments in the Union army and was so vehemently abolitionist and anti-secessionist that his activities were always of questionable nature.

⁹John D. Imboden, "The Battle of Piedmont," *Confederate Veteran*, December, 1912, 459.; Brice, 30-31.

agreed initially on the construction of a defensive line at Mowry's Hill. In a move that infuriated Imboden, however, Jones established the Confederate line near the small hamlet of Piedmont, a position that was less tactically advantageous.¹⁰

Turning now from the strategic situation in 1864 to the formation of the units themselves, it becomes apparent that an examination of the political and military situation in the upper Valley both before the war and after three years of conflict is crucial in order to appreciate and understand fully the efforts of this group of men. Similarly, an analysis of the motivation of the men joining the units is critical to permit a full development of the units' formation.

In the years before the Civil War, the Shenandoah Valley was characterized by an economic structure that revolved around small yeomen farmers producing wheat, other food crops and livestock. This economic system gave rise to a political consciousness which was very different from the outlook in the remainder of the Commonwealth.¹¹ The Valley was dominated by a philosophy which stressed independence and resistance to the pro-slavery, planter politics of the Tidewater region of Virginia. These intra-state divisions became even clearer as the push for secession intensified after Lincoln's election. Typically, historians have considered the western portions of Virginia, and especially the upper Valley, to have been Unionist strongholds. Indeed, on the initial vote at Virginia's secession convention the Valley region was one of the only areas of the Commonwealth that opposed the choice of secession. Lincoln's call for 75,000 Federal volunteers to crush the Southern insurrection, on April 15, 1861, placed the region in a dilemma. Valley historian C. E. May explains the Shenandoah region's reaction to Lincoln's request:

This action of President Lincoln made it evident to Western Virginians that their choice was really between remaining in the Union and fighting their Southern brethren or seceding from the Union and fighting the Yankees. Presented with this Hobson's choice, they chose secession. Hence, at the April 17, 1861 secession convention, the upper Valley reluctantly voted to support the Confederacy.

¹⁰Milton W. Humphreys, *A History of the Lynchburg Campaign* (Charlottesville: The Michie Company, 1924), 41; Imboden, "The Battle of Piedmont," 460. Jones replaced Imboden in command of the forces at Piedmont because he had held the rank of Brigadier General for one year longer than Imboden. Imboden and Jones argued extensively about the position of the Confederate defenses. Imboden in *Confederate Veteran* exclaimed:

'Good God General, You are not going to fight here and lose all the advantage of position we shall have at Mowry's Hill? We have no advantage of ground here, and [Hunter] outnumbered us nearly three to one and will beat us.' This seemed to anger him, for he replied with an oath: 'I don't want the advantage of ground for I can whip Hunter anywhere!' I entered my solemn protest against fighting there. This aroused his anger still further, and turning sharply toward me he said: 'Sir! I believe I am in command here to-day.'

¹¹William Couper, *History of the Shenandoah Valley*, vol. 2 (New York: Lewis Historical Publishing Company, Inc., 1952), 261.; C. E. May *Life Under Four Flags in North River Basin of Virginia* (Verona, Virginia: McClure Publishing Company, Inc., 1976), 380.

The secession decision prompted an immediate call up of Valley militia units to be pressed into Confederate service. The immediate objective of the men joining the Confederate army forming in Richmond was the prevention of Union military occupation of Virginia. The *Staunton Spectator* reported that: "There was a general feeling that the crisis was a solemn one, [people] were united with a firm and universal determination to resist the scheme set on foot by President Lincoln to subjugate the South."¹² The desire of men in these militia units to protect their state and section largely overrode the pre-war emphasis on Union. That the Augusta County, Virginia area was able to muster successfully an entire 2,000 man regiment into service by the end of April, 1861, attests to the potency of the Valley perception of Lincoln's war aims as a factor promoting enlistment.¹⁴

Despite this initial rush to join the Confederate cause, the upper Valley was not uniform in its support for the Confederate war effort. In the upper Valley there were a substantial number of religious groups opposed to slavery, secession, and war. Groups such as the Mennonites and Tunkers, who were present there, were exempted from conscription on the basis of conscientious objection.¹⁵ This exemption was granted by the Governor of Virginia out of respect for the pacifist beliefs these individuals possessed.

In addition to religious dissension, many residents believed that by joining the larger Confederate armies, they would be forced to fight in areas far removed from the Valley—perhaps even away from Virginia. These individuals generally had been pro-Union men who chose secession only when they felt their region was in danger. The idea that they could be forced to go on an offensive against the United States was anathema to them. Apart from the 2,000 men who had quickly joined the Confederate army, the pre-war political philosophy of the region had a significant impact on recruitment. Residents who were politically opposed to secession had two options when confronted with this decision to enlist. Staunton's role as a major supply depot allowed many citizens to "escape" Confederate service by becoming clerks, commissaries, or quartermasters.¹⁶ A smaller number of wealthier Valley residents could afford to hire substitutes to fight for them. Thus, the pre-war political views of upper Valley residents manifested themselves after the war began in two ways: it either motivated men to join regular units to fight to defend Virginia or it caused them to play a non-participatory role in the war.

¹²May, 380-381. It is interesting that the upper Valley was very politically and geographically similar to West Virginia which "seceded" from Virginia to join the Union in 1861. The distance between West Virginia and Staunton is about 60 miles, which created some problems for enrolling agents as persons opposed to Confederate service often fled to West Virginia.

¹³Lee A. Wallace, Jr., *Fifth Virginia Infantry* (Lynchburg, Virginia: H.E. Howard, Inc., 1988), 5.

¹⁴The drive for recruitment of home guard units had never been an issue prior to 1864. In 1861, the formation of the regular Confederate army had fulfilled the need for any type of defense force. In 1862, Jackson's Valley army was so effective in stopping Federal advances that no serious effort was ever made to call out a home guard.

¹⁵The Tunkers or Dunkers were similar to the Amish and Mennonites in their religious and pacifist beliefs. This group was extremely prominent in the northern portions of Augusta County. The Tunkers were eventually called Church of the Brethren.

¹⁶May, 415.; Brice, 27.

By 1864 the military situation in the Valley had changed so dramatically that the option of non-participation became less and less feasible. In spite of the urgent calls for men to defend their homes in 1861, the upper Valley was never seriously threatened with military occupation in that year. Even during the Valley campaign of 1862, the citizens of the region had been protected by Confederate regular units operating under the command of General "Stonewall" Jackson. In 1864, the Shenandoah Valley still did not have an organized defense provided by Confederate army forces. Imboden, as commander of the Valley district, was forced to muster local defense units into service to have any possibility of averting Union military takeover. Subsequently, men in the region took the option of joining a guard unit rather than face the unpleasant thought of leaving their homes and families undefended.

The military reality compelled the government of Virginia to begin a statewide recruiting effort to find men who were willing to serve in guard units. The legal basis for such a measure could be found in Virginia's pre-war militia codes. The militia law passed in 1860 and in effect in 1861 mandated that militia units were to be organized regionally and divided into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies based upon unit strength. The Virginia militia also contained separate infantry, cavalry, and artillery units.¹⁷ Virginia reorganized her militia force in November of 1861 to create the distinction of active and reserve militia units. The active units were formed under the supervision of officers and were constantly drilled and instructed on tactics. These active components were transferred directly into Confederate service in 1861, and thus were operational in areas separate from their respective regions during 1864. In this respect, some of the fears of Valley residents had been realized. Although militia units were supposed to be under state control, the Confederacy had used them liberally to support offensives in areas outside the Commonwealth of Virginia.¹⁸

By way of contrast, the reserve militia units were in an inactive status and were concentrated in the locality of their formation. Reserve units were not trained as extensively as their active counterparts and only participated in military exercises when "ordered into encampments and mustered into active service" by the Governor.¹⁹ Although these troops were technically "available," Virginia had not called them into active status prior to 1864. Confronted with the emerging threat in the Valley and the lack of manpower there, Brigadier General James L. Kemper, commander of the Virginia reserves, issued his General Order Number One. This order effectively enrolled the previously organized reserves

¹⁷Virginia. *An Ordinance to Reorganize the Militia*, (1861), 2.

¹⁸One unit that had been organized in the Valley and later moved to other theaters was Imboden's prized 62nd Virginia Mounted Infantry. Imboden had handpicked these men to form a local force to defend the Valley. These troops were well trained and had participated in several campaigns (most notably Gettysburg). In May 1864 they had been ordered to Richmond with Breckinridge and were in the works around Petersburg. Imboden attempted to get them back to counter Hunter's thrust but was rebuffed by General Lee. This troubled Imboden throughout the Battle of Piedmont, a fact he makes quite clear in his descriptions.

¹⁹Virginia. *An Ordinance Passed by the Convention of Virginia to Reorganize the Militia*, (November 29, 1861), 4.

into active service and ensured that their members were available for duty in the field. Included as well in the order were directions for the troops to provide themselves with the necessary ammunition, equipment, firearms, and provisions until state issues could be organized.²⁰

In the Valley, Imboden and his commander of reserves, Colonel Edwin G. Lee, extended this order to include men who were between the ages of 17 and 18 or 45 and 60. These young adults and older men were to be considered in the same legal category as those accountable under General Order Number One.²¹ Also considered for conscription into the reserve units were those citizens who had been exempted from service in regular Confederate army units. These citizens included tax collectors, postal clerks, supply officers, and quartermasters. In order to ensure their compliance with the recruitment orders, Imboden went so far as to threaten the imposition of martial law if these individuals refused to serve:

Head Q'rs Staunton

May 31st, 1864

The Genl. Commanding this District [Imboden] has at the moment notified me, that 'every man who can fire a Gun is urgently required at Mt. Crawford' - He says: 'I see no reason why Magistrates and Constables should not fight for their homes in a pinch like this.' 'A man should be ashamed to claim such a pitiful exemption.' 'If it becomes necessary to make them fight, I will DECLARE MARTIAL LAW in this district until the danger is over and MAKE every man shoulder his musket.' 'A man who will deliberately refuse to defend his home, wife & children for a few days ought to be forced into the ranks. IF KILLED, THE LOSS IS TRIFLING.'

Beverly Randolph

Major Commanding²²

Finally, Imboden and Lee tried to increase the combat experience of their force by recruiting regular Confederate officers and soldiers who were on furlough or convalescent leave in the area. Consequently, they depended on drawing enough men from the number remaining in the Valley to form adequately an effective reserve force.

Having established the military need for the home guard in the Upper Valley in 1864, it is essential to examine the reason behind the decision of upper Valley residents to join these forces. Fear of Union occupation was the major motivator for residents seeking to form local defense units and raid guard forces. As early as August of 1863, local residents began portraying the Union army as "an unscrupulous and vandal foe" bent on the destruction of the entire Valley.²³ As more information concerning "Black David" Hunter and his operations in the northern Shenandoah Valley filtered south to Staunton, the terror felt in the upper Valley grew in proportion. Local residents were absolutely convinced that

²⁰Staunton (Va.) *Vindicator* (Staunton, Virginia), 27 May 1864.

²¹Staunton (Va.) *Vindicator* (Staunton, Virginia), 27 April 1864.; Staunton (Va.) *Spectator* (Staunton, Virginia), 26 April 1864.

²²Brice, 30.

²³*Spectator*, 21 August 1863, 1.

the same fate that had befallen Woodstock and Newtown would repeat itself in Staunton and its surrounding areas.

This increasing revulsion toward Union actions in the Valley shifted the attitudes of the Valley citizenry from their pre-war Union bias to a distrust of the United States and particularly the Union army under the command of Major General Hunter. For instance, the *Staunton Spectator* and the more Unionist *Staunton Vindicator* began to stress the "wrongs and horrible outrages inflicted on our people" and urged Valley denizens to defend their homes against Union assault.²⁴ Many upper Valley citizens went so far as to confront the invaders directly about the legality of their actions. Union Colonel Strother described how two Valley women "twitted us politely about New Market and said that General Hunter's burning order was uncivilized and unmilitary." Strother also noted that most of the citizens with whom he came into contact displayed much displeasure and dismay with Federal military practices.²⁵

Civilians also began to hide valuables and prepare their homes for Hunter's arrival. Instead of respecting the army of the United States, local citizens began to refer to the Yankees as "villains" and "thieves." The fear of possible Union occupation markedly decreased Union sentiment in the upper Valley by the summer of 1864. As one resident told a surprised Union soldier: "[we] hate the Yankees and hope that you will all be captured and be sent to Richmond."²⁶ Given these sentiments, it is unlikely that the level of pro-Unionist sentiment that existed among the populace in the upper Valley during the 1864 campaign was great enough to have had a negative impact on home guard recruitment.

Hunter's reputation and the anxiety it elicited played directly into the hands of General Imboden and Colonel Lee. They saw the advantage that this changing attitude offered them and used the emotions of the Valley residents as a tool to recruit men for their units. Primarily, they hoped to convert the men's fear and their complementary desires to protect their homes and families into a feeling of patriotic obligation to enroll in units whose sole function was this protection. For example, Colonel Lee prefaced his announcement for the call-up of older men and young adults with the following patriotic entreaty: "It is deemed unnecessary to make an appeal to Virginians to step forward, without coercion and lend their aid to the noble armies that are now winning at such costly sacrifice, our independence. Our bleeding country points to its wounds in an appeal stronger than words."²⁷ Similarly, recruitment drives implored women of the community: "to compel by their urgent energy and spirit every man and boy to join some company so that

²⁴*Vindicator*, 29 April; 27 May 1864.; *Spectator*, 26 April; 24, 31 May 1864.

²⁵Eby, 237.

²⁶*Ibid*, 235-236.; James Alexander Crawford, Letters 1863-1864, Originals in possession of Archives, Augusta County (Va.) Historical Society, Staunton, Virginia.; Walker, 43.; Rose Page Pendleton, "General David Hunter's Sack of Lexington, Virginia: An Account by Rose Page Pendleton, June 18th, 1864," in *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, (April 1975), 173-183. Mrs. Pendleton noted that many Valley residents buried boxes with valuables in areas not likely to be searched by the Union soldiers. She was convinced that the Yankees were out only to rob and plunder. She said: "A quarter after four the vile rabble came scampering over the hills in swarms and the feelings of the poor Lexington proper may better be imagined than described." (p. 175).

²⁷*Vindicator*, 27 May 1864, 1.

when the enemy is on the trail no son of Augusta may be found shirking from the defense of mothers, wives and daughters of the old country."²⁸ In this manner, home guard recruitment efforts attempted to stress the horrors of possible Union destruction of the upper Valley in order to make it clear that only through service in a local defense unit could one's patriotic obligations to home and family be fulfilled.

Such an appeal was designed to attract men who had, for various reasons, chosen not to participate in the regular Confederate army. The decision against serving was based on several factors. The most important of these factors was apprehension about the possibility of being used outside the Valley or outside Virginia. Another major factor was the deepening feeling of hopelessness that became prevalent in the wake of Confederate military setbacks in 1864. Apart from the 2,000 initial troops Augusta County had sent to the Confederate army in 1861, very few local men had ever had any interest in fighting for the Confederacy. By 1864, the decreasing likelihood of Confederate victory had all but eliminated the desire of Valley residents to struggle against the growing Union military juggernaut. Union attempts to bleed the Confederacy white had not gone unnoticed in Staunton. Thus, Grant's emphasis on a "total war" policy had effectively broken the will of Southern citizens, at least in the Valley, to fight.

Imboden and Lee, in their recruiting efforts sought to allay these concerns. For instance, the large number of male residents who did not serve in the regular army because they were fearful of being used outside the Valley area or outside Virginia could enroll in a local defense unit with a clear sense of duty. In fact, the General Orders creating the reserve regiments were specifically written to prohibit the assignment of these guard units to duties except for local defense and raid protection.²⁹ Moreover, the noble idea of protecting home and family was effective in overcoming the fear of direct action against Union forces. Men who were confronted with a "must-win" situation with their homes and families at stake were much easier to convince to enroll. This point indicates that men who were reluctant to serve with General Robert E. Lee in Richmond could be persuaded to fight to defend their homes and families in the upper Valley area. S. T. Shank, a member of the Augusta reserves summarized this belief: "It was also known [by the enrolling officers] that many [North River Basin residents] would be willing to enlist in a service of this kind who would never serve in the regular army."³⁰

Obviously, the response of local men to the call for enrollment is of critical importance in the examination of the units. In general, the recruitment efforts of Imboden and Lee were successful. They were able to enroll about 1,000 men and form almost two complete regiments of reserves in less than three months.³¹ Characteristically, the emotional response of the enrollees was predicated upon their desire to protect homes and families. A remark from Lieutenant Berkeley underscored this point:

²⁸*Vindicator*, 21 April 1864, 1.

²⁹*Vindicator*, 27 May 1864, 1.; *Spectator*, 31 May 1864, 1.

³⁰S. T. Shank, "The Army Under Lincoln in West Virginia," *Confederate Veteran*, November, 1923, 20.

³¹Brigadier General John D. Imboden (CSA) to Major Samuel McCue, 25 April 1864, Transcript in the hand of Special Collections, University of Kentucky Library, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.; Imboden, "The Battle of Piedmont," 459.

...all had the feeling that day and were inspired that behind us were our mothers, wives, sisters, and sweethearts. At home bright eyes were sparkling for us and we would defend them to the last.³²

Confederate reserve Captain James A. Crawford expressed similar feelings when he commented that men defending their homes in the mountains were "heroic souls— notable for their courage, purity, and devotion." Men who had been wounded while in the regular service and were home on leave quickly joined the home guard. One such man was John N. Opie, who was so intensely motivated that he raised his own company of reserves and offered them to Imboden for service.³³ Thus the majority of men in the upper Valley did respond to their "patriotic obligation to serve." Perhaps Lieutenant Berkeley summarized their reactions most ably:

Over and over again had this beautiful valley been robbed and plundered and horribly had its inhabitants suffered, but nothing could dampen their ardor and love for the cause for which they were so heroically battling³⁴

Among the men opposed to service on religious grounds, this patriotic response was less pronounced. To the Tunkers and Mennonites, home defense was not a sufficient cause for them to deviate from the practice of pacifism because it was the cornerstone of their religion. Indeed, many members of these sects chose to move into the bordering free states rather than enroll in home defense reserves.³⁵ Peter S. Roller, a county justice, wrote about the exodus of his Mennonite friends to his son in February of 1864: "Some people from our neighborhood are going to Yankeedom. Four left last night. We hear almost daily of [neighbors] leaving for the north."³⁶ This observation demonstrates that the religious beliefs of some upper Valley residents were strong enough to cause them to "defect" to the north instead of fighting to protect their homelands.

The effectiveness of Imboden's recruitment efforts demonstrates that fear of Union occupation and of the ensuing destruction of upper Valley residences and towns was a definite motivating factor for men joining the home guard units (with the possible exception of members of the Mennonite and Tunker sects). Upper Valley men provided one-fourth of the available Confederate manpower at the Battle of Piedmont on short notice. This is impressive when one realizes that the total number of men recruited to serve in Harper's and Harman's regiments was about one half the total recruited in the emotional frenzy following secession in 1861. Further, since these men were less motivated to fight than their counterparts in 1861, the mere creation of the units is remarkable. Hence, the design of the recruitment drives was successful in harnessing the fear of Valley citizens in order to obtain a force that was able to join in battle.

Recruiting the home guard was one problem; guaranteeing that they would be trained and equipped properly was an even more daunting task. Deficiencies in leadership, training, and equipment rendered the home guard units less effective than a regular Confederate or Union army unit of similar size.

The recruiting efforts of Colonel Lee and Brigadier General Imboden were sufficient to produce the manpower for two slightly understrength reserve regiments and one battery of artillery. Imboden noted that he was accompanied by "1,000 brave and noble men" as he moved to Mount Crawford on the eve of the Battle of Piedmont.³⁷ These two regiments (approximately 500 men each) were placed under the command of Staunton militia officers, Colonel Kenton W. Harper and Colonel William H. Harman. The regiments were then subdivided into as many as eleven companies, each of which was commanded by company and squad grade officers elected by the men of the units. (Appendix D)

The senior officers in the home guard units had either seen previous combat or had some military training. Colonel Harman had commanded the Staunton militia unit in Mexico, and Colonel Harper had served under him there as a lieutenant. After the war, both had become general officers in charge of separate divisions of Valley militia troops. They remained in this capacity until General Stonewall Jackson decommissioned all militia officers above the rank of Colonel. Harper and Harman were reappointed as colonels of Virginia volunteers and fought in the early Civil War campaigns in Northern Virginia and later operated with militia units in Jackson's Valley Campaign of 1862.³⁸ Imboden chose Harman to be his senior reserve field officer primarily because of his reputation as a leader and because "Harman is the best man out [Imboden's emphasis] of service that I know for the position...Harman is the first man I could apply to with the certainty of getting the results to the extent I might require."³⁹ There is little doubt that these men were capable leaders with sufficient war experience to understand battle tactics and their application.

In contrast to the level of experience possessed by the senior officers, the company and squad grade leaders within the ranks of the militia units were typically untrained in military tactics and doctrine. Only a small number had ever seen any combat. Among the men who had battle experience, only three had seen action in the Civil War: Captain John N. Opie, Captain Robert Doyle, and Captain Henry Peck. These men were officers who had been wounded in regular army service and were in the Valley recuperating or on indefinite leave.⁴⁰ It is unknown how many of the officers possessed any type of military training apart from combat experience. It is extremely unlikely, however, that any graduates of military institutions such as Virginia Military Institute would have

³²Carter Berkeley, "Augusta's Battle," *Staunton (Va.) Spectator and Vindicator*, 29 July 1904, 1.; Crawford Letters 30 May 1864. The Two Staunton newspapers merged under common ownership in the 1870s.

³³John N. Opie, *A Rebel Cavalryman with Lee, Stuart, and Jackson* (Chicago: W.B. Conkey Company, 1899), 218.

³⁴Berkeley, 1.

³⁵May, 404-405.

³⁶Peter S. Roller to Lieutenant John Edwin (CSA), 16 February 1864 quoted in C. E. May, *Life Under Four Flags in North River Basin of Virginia*, (Verona, Virginia: McClure Publishing Co., Inc., 1976), 410.

³⁷Imboden, "The Battle of Piedmont," 460.

³⁸Brice, 31.

³⁹Imboden, Letter, 25 April 1864, 3.

⁴⁰Brice, 155.; Opie, 218.

served at such a low grade (captain or below) or in a reserve unit at that stage in the war.⁴¹ Generally, the low level of skill implies that these officers could not have instructed their men in the battlefield tactics that were required to ensure even a marginal performance in combat. Further, the fact that the majority of the officers in the reserves were chosen by election rather than on the basis of military merit adds to the speculation that the lower-level leadership may have been incapable of effectively maneuvering and fighting their units.⁴²

Another problem that aggravated the inexperienced leadership of the units was the amount of training they underwent prior to battle. The militia codes of the Commonwealth of Virginia required that militia units be trained to the full extent of instructions found in either *The Volunteer's Manual* or *Hardee's Tactics*. These voluminous works detailed the multitude of tactical maneuvers that were possible at the battalion, company, or squad levels. They mandated separate "schools" (i.e. the School of the Company) for each type and level of tactics to ensure that the procedures were completely understood.⁴³ The earliest account of the training of any sizable number of volunteers into a home defense unit is documented in the *Staunton Spectator*. The paper reported that a unit of 50 men were to begin drilling in these tactics to organize a volunteer raid guard in September, 1863.⁴⁴ The roster of these men indicates that they formed the nucleus of Harman's regiment of reserves. Since home guard units had not been recruited or organized in large numbers prior to the spring of 1864, the men of the regiments could not have received anywhere near Hardee's mandated level of instruction. Therefore, it is a safe guess that these men were, with the exception of perhaps fifty "trained" members, relatively ignorant of basic battlefield practices. In addition to basic deficiencies in leadership and training, the home guard regiments also suffered from a lack of effective equipment. By this stage of the Civil War, veteran Confederate forces were equipped with a plethora of inadequate weapons. For example, Lee's forces had been reduced to using impressed weapons (primarily smoothbore muskets and hunting rifles) and rifles that were captured from Union prisoners and casualties because they could not count on effective resupply from Confederate sources. As more and more Confederate armories fell to Union occupation, the armament problem in the

⁴¹The majority of graduates from Virginia Military Institute were in service with the regular Confederate army by the spring of 1861, usually as colonels or commanders at the regimental level. By 1864, many former graduates had been advanced to general officer rank either on staffs or in field command. Thomas A. Lewis notes in *The Shenandoah In Flames: The Valley Campaign of 1864*. (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1987), 16, that VMI had provided "425 of the thousand or so trained army officers available to the Confederacy when the Civil War began."

⁴²The process of electing officers was not uncommon in either the regular Confederate army or the Union army. Officers under the rank of Major (second lieutenant, first lieutenant, and captain) were chosen by popular vote of the enlisted men. Senior non-commissioned officers were also selected in this manner. A detailed description of the officer selection process can be found in James I. Robertson, *Soldiers Blue and Gray* (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988) and Bell I. Wiley, *The Life of Johnny Reb: The Common Soldier of the Confederacy* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1943).

⁴³D. W. C. Baxter, *The Volunteer's Manual* (Philadelphia: King and Baird, 1861), 1-3.

⁴⁴*Spectator*, 21 August 1863, 1. The term "raid guard" was how many Valley reserves referred to themselves.

South grew more serious. This problem was acknowledged in Kemper's General Order Number One, which required members of reserve units to provide their own ammunition and firearms. For the home guard units this meant that the weapons available could range anywhere from "squirrel" rifles and shotguns to smoothbore muskets and Enfield or Springfield rifles. Regular Union army troops were equipped with the .59 caliber Springfield or Enfield rifle, which were more accurate and had a longer range.⁴⁵ Because the upper Valley home guard units possessed such a wide variety of weapons, it was virtually impossible for Confederate quartermasters to obtain more powder and cartridges for the units.⁴⁶ Thus, the men went into battle with what they had with them and with no guarantee of resupply once they had exhausted their own stocks of ammunition. Conversely, the Union forces could count on efficient replenishment of both weapons and ammunition. This discrepancy in armament placed the home guard recruits at an extreme disadvantage when compared to regular Union troops. This disadvantage was, of course, most noticeable in a tactical situation.

The artillery possessed by the upper Valley units was just as inadequate. The Boys Battery had managed to procure two 20-pound Parrot cannons and one 24-pound howitzer. Unfortunately, one of its Parrots had been captured from Union forces at an earlier battle and was found, according to Confederate artillerist Milton Humphreys, to be "worse than useless." In addition, the horses and carriages for these batteries were obtained from Valley residents, as the impressment of these implements was necessary to ensure a workable battery.⁴⁷ In the Civil War, where artillery was recognized as the "Queen of the Battlefield," the absence of effective artillery support limited the ability of the home guard units to counter Union artillery or to operate against Union infantry assaults.

These were the men who marched into battle at Piedmont on June 4, 1864. It is important to recognize the impact which the deficits in the home guard units' leadership, training, and equipment had on their battlefield performance. An examination of eyewitness accounts of the battle offers the best insight into the effectiveness of the Augusta reserves in combat.

During the evening of June 4 and continuing into the morning of June 5, 1864, the Confederate forces prepared their defenses north of Piedmont. General Jones took command of the left (northern) side of the Confederate line and placed Imboden in command of the Confederate right (Appendix E). Jones gave Imboden specific orders to remain on the right flank with his men to prevent an expected

⁴⁵William A. Albaugh and Edward N. Simmons, *Confederate Arms* (Harrisburg: The Stackpole Company, 1957), 50-51.; Thomas A. Lewis, *The Shenandoah in Flames: The Valley Campaign of 1864* (Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, 1987), 142. Albaugh has an extensive discussion of the use of privately owned guns in Confederate service. He notes that the number of such weapons able to be procured was never very large and that the weapons were inferior to those used by the Union forces in both range (less than 200 yards effective) and accuracy. He also concludes that private weapons were barely suitable for the infantry units that had them and unacceptable to cavalry forces.

⁴⁶The Confederate Quartermaster Corps had never been able to standardize the weapons and ammunition its forces needed in the field. The multiple varieties of weapons used prevented any type of routine supply and hindered the performance of regular and home guard forces.

⁴⁷Humphreys, 30.

Union turning maneuver there.⁴⁸ Indeed, Jones believed that any Federal assault would concentrate on the right flank. Jones had situated the Confederate left so that the Augusta County home guards units, Colonel Kenton W. Harper's and Colonel William H. Harman's regiments of reserves, would be anchored against the village, and thus be protected from Union assaults. Federal reconnaissance, however, revealed an error Jones had made in positioning his units and Hunter immediately decided to launch a general assault on the Confederate left.⁵¹ In order to complete this maneuver, the Union infantry regiments passed directly in front of Imboden's force on the Confederate right flank. This movement placed the Confederate units in an excellent position to assault the exposed flank of the marching Union units. Imboden, however, did nothing to stop the Federal advance. He explained:

...if Vaughn and I had had orders or permission discretion [sic.] to move, a rapid charge on the left flank of this flanking brigade [34th Massachusetts] would have at least checked it and given Jones time to change front to the right and repel it. But Vaughn's order, like mine, as [Jones] informed me that night, were preemptory, to take the position and hold it, *till further orders*. [Imboden's emphasis]⁵²

Because of a mixup in communication, Imboden never attacked the Union forces, and as a result, they were able to come into contact with the Augusta reserve force.

As Hunter's units were preparing to assault the Confederate left, Jones began to correct the error he had made in positioning the units. He sought to fill the gap by adjusting the position of Harper's and Harman's reserves and by moving Marquis' Boys Battery, a reserve artillery unit, into the hole.⁵³ The Boys Battery was ineffective in countering the Union advance and by the time the reserve regiments had moved into the gap, Hunter's forces had already begun to pour through the opening.⁵⁴ The guard units were able to form a weak line and began firing into the lead Federal unit (the 34th Massachusetts). This action briefly halted the Union movement and gave the reserve regiments time to rally. Their advance cut off a portion of the Massachusetts regiment and forced Colonel Campbell, the commander of the 54th Pennsylvania, to reinforce the weakened portion of the advancing Union line.⁵⁵ The

⁴⁸John D. Imboden, "The Battle of Piedmont," *Confederate Veteran*, January, 1913, 18. Imboden's article providing his account of the Battle of Piedmont was broken into two segments for publication in *Confederate Veteran*, they will be treated as one continuous article henceforth.

⁴⁹John D. Imboden, "An Augusta Battlefield," *Staunton (Va.) Vindicator*, 13 July 1894, 1.; Humphreys, 35.; Humphreys, 41.

⁵⁰DuPont, 60.

⁵¹Humphreys, 38.; DuPont, 61.; DuPont, 63.

⁵²Imboden, "The Battle of Piedmont," 19.

⁵³Humphreys, 44.

⁵⁴The Boys Battery was literally composed of teenagers under the age of 18. The unit had been plagued by problems throughout the Battle of Piedmont. They had unfortunately been selected as the first target for DuPont's opening barrage from the strong 22 gun Union battery. Their cannons received several direct hits effectively knocking them out of the battle. In addition, evidence shows that their ammunition was faulty. Humphreys noted on page 40 and 41 that in the heat some of the shells exploded inside the cannons and killed Confederate gunners. Walker also points out that due to defects in their guns, the Boys Battery sent a number of shells into Jones' 60th Virginia Infantry regiment, killing and wounding some of their own men (page 94).

⁵⁵Brice, 74.; Humphreys, 44-45.

Union forces, thus strengthened, began to advance across the narrow road which separated them from the Confederate home defense troops.

Unfortunately for the Confederates, the Union volley preceding their second advance had killed General Jones, who was attempting to strengthen his defenses. Jones' death was communicated to the reserve units by their adjutant, Walter K. Martin, who rode up the line yelling, "General Jones is killed! We have no leader now!"⁵⁶ The unprofessional manner in which this news was spread caused the inexperienced reserve troops to panic, and their hastily constructed line broke. The untrained leaders of the force were unable to rally their troops; and indeed, many of the officers were fleeing the scene with their men. The initial advance of the Union infantry now became a rush as the reserve regiments collapsed. Lieutenant Carter Berkeley of the Staunton reserve artillery commented, "We were soon surrounded by our own flying men and in the sight of the Yankees, our men began to give way."⁵⁷ Captain John N. Opie, an officer in Harman's regiment concurred: "Our men being hard pressed by the enemy at this time and learning of the death of Jones, broke ranks and fled from the battle-field."⁵⁸

Imboden observed the failure of the reserve regiments and "saw the day was lost and ordered [my] men to mount so as to be ready to cover the retreating infantry."⁵⁹ The Confederates were by now in full retreat and were being harried by Union cavalry as they fled toward New Hope. (Appendix G) Imboden's cavalry was able to cover the retreat effectively, and impending nightfall prevented any further Union attempts to engage the Confederates. Hunter regrouped his troops and began to march on Staunton. The Confederate units that had retreated to Fishersville and Waynesboro no longer presented any type of viable opposition to the advance.⁶⁰

In less than an hour, the primary activity of the Augusta County home defense units had passed. By examining the battle's outcome, one can see how sharply the units' lack of training, leadership, and equipment affected their performance at Piedmont. Inexperience was probably the major factor. Lieutenant Berkeley committed his feelings about this issue to paper after the battle: "How vain the attempt to rush untried soldiers through a stampeding line of battle to check and drive back a victorious line advancing. Old veterans could hardly have stood it."⁶¹ In addition, the reserve infantry and artillery units were not able to form effectively a strong defensive line to counter Hunter's general assault; not only had they been rushed into the gap in the Confederate line but also they had no knowledge of how to seal such a gap.⁶² Their lack of training in battlefield tactics resulted in the utter collapse of the weak line they did manage to form. This breakdown was exacerbated by the fact that lower echelon leaders had no training or experience in rallying harried troops in battle.

⁵⁶Opie, 221.

⁵⁷Berkeley, 1.

⁵⁸Opie, 221.

⁵⁹Imboden, "The Battle of Piedmont," 19.

⁶⁰Imboden, "The Battle of Piedmont," 20.; Berkeley, 1.; Humphreys, 52.

⁶¹Berkeley, 1.

⁶²Walker discusses the general response of the home guardsmen in a less flattering manner. He notes on page 101 that: "The Home Guardsmen were civilians, not veterans...these men were not anxious to fight. Unlike the regular army they did not obey without questioning [Jones's] orders. Many in the Home Guard reacted as civilians to Jones: many failed to move toward the fighting."

This lack of experience combined with the units' panicky state after learning of Jones's death resulted in a classic rout.

Compounding the lack of training and effective leadership was the units' failure to utilize their already inadequate weapons. Humphreys noted that the Boys Battery was almost instantly silenced by the fire of the Union cannons and offered no support to the reserve regiments in the gap. Further, the reserve regiments were assaulted by Union forces that had the upper hand in infantry weapons; and without artillery support, they were unable to mount an effective resistance. Several of the attacking Federal regiments were equipped with Spencer repeating carbines (in addition to regular rifles), which when combined with their numerical superiority, turned the tide against the home guard forces.⁶³ Simply put, the odds were stacked against the home guard forces from the battle's start.

Although the units had these major disadvantages, they were able initially to perform effectively with nothing but their emotional drive to sustain them. Lewis Peyton, a participant and local historian, commented: "The Confederates behaved like veterans...there was now nothing whole about them but their hearts."⁶⁴ Brigadier General Vaughn, who had been present at Piedmont made a similar analysis:

For the gallant manner in which [Colonel Harper's command] bore themselves in the engagement at Piedmont on the 5th inst., [Vaughn] especially [sends] his thanks and takes pleasure in commending their chivalrous conduct to the soldiers of the regular service as examples of bravery worthy of emulation.⁶⁵

Vaughn also noted that the upper echelon leadership of the reserve units was responsible "for the efficiency and good discipline of the forces on a fatiguing march [especially since Harman's] command [was not] inured to the hardships of such a march."⁶⁶ Imboden concluded that: "no troops ever fought better than those who were engaged" at Piedmont "to protect their soil and county seat from the invader's foot."⁶⁷ These responses paint the reserve units as being the equal of Union forces engaged at the battle.

In spite of these glowing accounts, the emotionalism and desire to protect homes and families could not overcome the material deficiencies and combat inexperience the units faced. Confederate home guard Captain John Opie, a combat veteran, was fearful that his men would break, "as many of them had never been in a battle before." At Piedmont, the units responded much as he expected:

...being completely panic-stricken and without a leader; they fled from the battle-field in utmost disorder and at the top of their speed. In their

terror many of them threw away everything that could impede them in their flight not a few throwing away their muskets.⁶⁸

These descriptions of the units in action are probably closer to reality than the accounts of Imboden and Vaughn. This is true for two possible reasons. First, following the battle, much controversy emerged about the failure of Imboden and Vaughn to act against the Union flanking maneuver. Such criticism may have prompted these leaders to overstate the bravery and combat effectiveness of the reserve units which bore the brunt of the Union charge. Second, both sets of laudatory remarks were written for the Staunton newspapers. It is unlikely that Vaughn, and especially Imboden, a local resident, would downplay or disparage the units' performance in that medium. Milton Humphreys questioned Imboden's remarks about the local guard units: "[Imboden] then bases a beautiful tribute to the heroism and devotion of Confederate soldiers upon the bravery with which this heterogeneous mass fought. Unfortunately this tribute is based on something that never occurred."⁶⁹ Colonel Lee's official report to Richmond probably offered the best concise summary of the units' combat effectiveness: "We have been pretty badly whipped."⁷⁰

The failure of the reserves to rally after Jones' death and their subsequent flight from the battlefield was typical of units undergoing their first combat experience. Opie compared the reserve units' response at Piedmont with the Union army's collapse at the First Battle of Bull Run in 1861. He said: "In this battle [Piedmont], our men imitated the conduct of the enemy at First Manassas."⁷¹ Thus, the reserves' response to their first battle was not a significant departure from the behavior of other non-veteran troops.

When the reserves again saw action on March 2, 1865, at the Battle of Waynesboro (Appendix G), they generally fared no better against another veteran Union force. Jedediah Hotchkiss, a veteran of General Stonewall Jackson's Valley Army and of Lee's Staff, commented on the effectiveness of the reserves in this battle:

Our left flank [which contained the reserves] gave way, followed by the giving way of the whole line and one of the most terrible panics and stampedes I have ever seen. There was a perfect rout along the road up to the mountain and the enemy dashed rapidly into the swarm of flying men, wagons, etc.⁷²

⁶³Opie, 219.; Ibid., 222.

⁶⁴Humphreys, 49.

⁶⁵United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Series* 1, Vol. 37, Part 1, (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1880-1901), 151.

⁶⁶Opie, 224. Captain Opie refers here to the disastrous retreat that the Federal army undertook at the conclusion of the First Battle of Bull Run on July 21, 1861. An exhausted Union line collapsed in the face of a Confederate assault and the ensuing retreat which began in an orderly fashion became a panic-filled rout as Union troops sought to escape to Washington, D.C.

⁶⁷Archie P. McDonald, ed., *Make Me a Map of the Valley: The Civil War Journal of Stonewall Jackson's Topographer, Jedediah Hotchkiss* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1973), 259.; Jubal A. Early, *Lieutenant General Jubal Anderson Early, C. S. A.: An Autobiographical Sketch and Narrative of the War Between The States* (Philadelphia: J. P. Lippincott Company, 1912), 121-122.

⁶⁸The number of men in the attacking Federal units (the 34th Massachusetts, 54th Pennsylvania, and the dismounted 1st New York Cavalry) outnumbered the Augusta reserves about 3 to 1. When the number of effective weapons they could use is factored into the equation, they presented dominating breakthrough firepower.

⁶⁹J. Lewis Peyton, *History of Augusta County, Virginia* (Staunton, Virginia: Samuel M. Yost & Son, 1882), 234.

⁷⁰*Vindicator*, 8 July 1864, 1.

⁷¹Ibid.

⁷²Imboden, "An Augusta Battlefield," 1.

The presence of first battle anxiety among the reserve regiments could not have been a major factor at Waynesboro. The reserve units were still inexperienced, having been detached from the roster of forces in the Valley in late June, 1864, and had seen no combat since Piedmont. But they had been bloodied. More likely, the sheer lack of effective weaponry and training made them ineffective when placed in open combat against veteran Union forces. Major General Jubal A. Early, commander of Confederate forces at the Battle of Waynesboro, revealed the impact inferior weapons and combat inexperience had on the reserves: "Yet some excuse is to be made for my men, as they knew they were weak and the enemy very strong."⁷³ The point of these various remarks is that a quickly-mobilized reserve force with little training, effective leadership or weaponry could not be expected to be the tactical equal of a veteran force. Further, for a unit to become a "veteran force," a long period of battlefield experience was necessary. Harper's and Harman's units could not develop this veteran status because they were never in prolonged combat action. While it is true that the units were motivated by an intense desire to win, and thus protect their homes and families, it is equally true that desire alone does not win battlefield victories.

It is quite obvious that the reserve and home guard units formed in response to Major General David Hunter's raid into the upper Valley failed in their primary objective of stopping the Union advance. A study of their major action in the campaign, the Battle of Piedmont, June 5, 1864, has uncovered some interesting and historically important discoveries concerning the formation and effectiveness of these forces.

The most striking conclusion that can be drawn is that an imminent military threat to one's home can necessitate the creation of a force to provide a last-ditch defense. Men who would not ordinarily take arms against an adversary can have their perceptions radically altered by fears that their homes and families may be in danger. The upper Valley is a superb example of this phenomenon. Before the Civil War, the region had been strongly Unionist and strictly against secession. Yet, after three years of conflict and with the immediate threat of the area's destruction by Union forces, Valley men rallied to join home guard units to protect their lands. They were willing to do this even if it meant attacking forces from a country they had strongly supported previously.

Similarly, an analysis of the units' recruitment, training, leadership, and equipment reveals that typical home guard units were not able to compete against regular, veteran forces. The upper Valley reserves are a good example of a force that was numerically strong but unable to perform at their full potential precisely because of material and leadership deficiencies. Even after the units' first exposure to combat, they did not operate in prolonged service long enough to reach the level of tactical expertise that was necessary to participate in pitched battle against Federal veterans. In short, it can be argued that any force that is

⁷³Early, 126. Early notes that the only significant casualty at the Battle of Waynesboro that he was aware of was Colonel William H. Harman, the commander of the Augusta reserves. Harman had apparently been killed in the streets of the town and there was some speculation that he had been shot *after* being made prisoner. Early indicated that Harman may have attempted to escape after the battle.

inexperienced and poorly led will not be able to engage effectively in open combat against skilled, professional troops. This analysis is just as valid today as it was for the Civil War era.

These conclusions permit the historian to make several important generalizations. The perception of threats to one's home and family and the fear this generates were sufficient to produce a desire to fight back that overrode any political considerations that may have initially prevented such action. Moreover, this fear can be manufactured into a potent tool for the recruitment of military forces. Still, an intense desire to win cannot override basic military shortcomings. The unique experience of a small region facing military occupation and the subsequent formation of forces to protect it can provide important historical generalizations that will assist historians not only in studying the 1864 Valley Campaign but also the formation of military forces in general.

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
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
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Appendix A — The Upper Shenandoah Valley



Reprinted from Thomas A. Lewis, *The Shenandoah in Flames: The Valley Campaign of 1864*, Alexandria, Virginia: Time-Life Books, Inc., 1987, 2.

Appendix B — Imboden's Pre-Battle Position



Reprinted from Marshall Moore Brice, *Conquest of a Valley*, Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1965, 28.

Appendix C — Lower Level Organization of Home Guard Regiments

The following information reveals the breakdown of the reserve regiments into companies along with their company leadership. The names of these men were originally published in the *Staunton Vindicator* on August 19, 1864. Subsequently, they were included in Marshall Moore Brice's definitive work on the Battle of Piedmont, *Conquest of a Valley*.

Colonel Kenton Harper's Regiment of Reserves

Company A: Captain J. M. Hardy; Lieutenants Steinbuck and Wright
Company B: Captain Robert L. Doyle
Company C: Captain J. M. Templeton
Company D: Captain Henry H. Peck
Company E: Captain John Newton Opie
Company F: Captain Rippetoe
Company G: Captain Byrd; Lieutenant James A. Syms
Company H: Captain Hilbert
Company I: Captain Bacon
Company K: Lieutenant Monroe Blue

Colonel William Harman's Regiment of Reserves


1st Company: Captain J. F. Hottle; First Lieutenant John Seawright;
Second Lieutenant David W. Coiner, Third Lieutenant
William McFall

2nd Company: Captain Robert W. Stevenson; First Lieutenant William
Blackburn; Second Lieutenant J. A. Crawford; Third
Lieutenant William Morris

3rd Company: Captain James C. Cochran; First Lieutenant Thomas
Coleman; Second Lieutenant Peter R. Bright; Third
Lieutenant Peter E. Houff

4th Company: Captain John Nunan; First Lieutenant John Beard;
Second Lieutenant J. C. Baum; Third Lieutenant G. K.
Lewis

Appendix D — Confederate and Federal Positions at the Battle of Piedmont



Reprinted from Marshall Moore Brice, *Conquest of a Valley*, Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1965, 76.

Appendix E – Confederate and Federal Forces at the Battle of Piedmont

The following roster of units in action at the battle of Piedmont was compiled by Milton Humphreys in his book, *A History of the Lynchburg Campaign*. He used the list of Union and Confederate forces found in the *Official Records* (from Hunter's and Vaughn's reports).

Confederate Forces—Brigadier General W. E. Jones

Infantry

Thirty-Sixth Virginia Regiment - Major Fife
Sixtieth Virginia Regiment - Colonel B. H. Jones
Forty-Fifth Virginia Regiment - Colonel W. H. Browne
Forty-Fifth Virginia Battalion - Lieutenant Colonel Beckley
"Harper's Regiment of Reserves" - Colonel Kenton Harper
An organization probably a "regiment," of various irregulars [Humphreys refers to Harman's Regiment of Reserves]

Cavalry

Imboden's Brigade - Brigadier General J. D. Imboden
Eighteenth Virginia Cavalry - Colonel Geo. Imboden
Twenty-Third Virginia Cavalry - Colonel White
Major Harry Gilmore's Maryland Battalion
Major Sturgis Davis's Maryland Battalion
Vaughn's Brigade - Brigadier General J. C. Vaughn

Artillery

Bryan's Battery - 6 pieces - Captain Bryan
McClanahan's Battery - 4 pieces - Captain McClanahan
Marquis' Boys Battery - 4 pieces - Captain Marquis

Federal Forces - Major General David Hunter

Infantry

Sullivan's Division - Brigadier General J. C. Sullivan
First Brigade - Colonel Augustus Moor
Eighteenth Connecticut - Colonel Ely
Second Maryland Eastern Shore - Colonel Rodgers
Twenty-eight Ohio - Lieutenant Colonel Becker
Hundred and Sixteenth Ohio - Colonel Washburn
Hundred and Twenty-third Ohio - Major Kellog

Second Brigade - Colonel Thoburn


Thirty-fourth Massachusetts - Colonel Wells
Fifty-fourth Pennsylvania - Colonel Cambell
First West Virginia - Lieutenant Colonel Weddle
Twelfth West Virginia - Colonel Curtis
Fifth New York Heavy Artillery (4 companies as infantry)
- Lieutenant Colonel Murray

Artillery

Artillery Brigade - Captain H. A. DuPont


Light Battery "B," Fifth United States Artillery,
6 3 inch rifles.
Snow's Light Battery "B," Maryland Artillery,
6 3 inch rifles
Carlin's Light Battery "D," West Virginia Artillery,
6 3 inch rifles
Von Kleiser's Thirtieth New York Light Battery,
4 Napoleon guns

Appendix F — Confederate Retreat After Piedmont



Reprinted from Marshall Moore Brice, *Conquest of a Valley*, University of Virginia Press, 1965, 91.

Appendix G — The Battle of Waynesboro



Reprinted from United States War Department, *Atlas to Accompany the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1891-1895, pl. 122.

In Memoriam

**Katherine Gentry Bushman
1919-1997**

The Augusta County Historical Society suffered a serious loss with the death of one of its charter members, Katherine G. Bushman. From the time the society was organized in 1965, Katherine took an active part in its work. For many years she served on the Committee on Archives, and for a number of years was chair of the Genealogical Committee. For several years in the 1970s, she served as co-chair and as chair of the Landmark Committee.

In 1974, the members elected Katherine Bushman as President of the Society. At that time when the nation marked the anniversary of independence, she also served on the Bicentennial Project committee. It was during this term that Mrs. Silva E. Clem, who had edited the *Augusta Historical Bulletin* from its inception, retired from that position. Katherine took over the editing of the *Bulletin* in 1975, and continued that important work on behalf of the Society until her death.

Katherine Bushman's knowledge of the historical records of Augusta County was unparalleled. Her awareness of their value caused her to undertake leadership of the effort to carry out conservation measures on these rare and much-used documents. The work which she encouraged the Daughters of the American Revolution to sponsor is now being sponsored by the county officials.

Her work in indexing marriage records, and her publication of naturalization records and of the free black registers were significant contributions to making important documents available to historians and genealogists.

Katherine's family has placed her large collection of genealogical research materials in the Library of Virginia. Researchers will always know that they can travel to Richmond to avail themselves of this superb research resource.

The Society extends its sympathy to her husband, William Bushman, their three sons and their families. We are grateful to have had the privilege of working with Katherine, and are grateful for her decades of work on behalf of the history of Augusta County and its people.

Presidents of the Augusta County Historical Society

- * Dr. Richard P. Bell, 1964-1966
- * Harry Lee Nash, Jr., 1966-1967
- * Dr. Marshall M. Bruce, 1967-1968
- * Dr. James Sprunt, 1968-1970
- * Richard M. Hamrick, Jr., 1970-1972
- * Josiah H. Young, III, 1972-1974
- * Mrs. William Bishman, 1974-1976
- * John W. Dandridge, Jr., 1976-1977
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- * Chapter Member of Society
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